{"metadata":[{"label":{"en":["Resource Title"],"pl":["Tytuł źródłowy"]},"value":{"pl":["Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Ekonomia"]}},{"label":{"en":["Date issued"],"pl":["Data wydania"]},"value":{"en":["2019"],"pl":["2019"],"universal":["2019"]}},{"label":{"en":["Volume"],"pl":["Tom/Rocznik"]},"value":{"en":["25"],"pl":["25"],"universal":["25"]}},{"label":{"en":["Related Identifier Type"],"pl":["Typ identyfikatora"]},"value":{"en":["ISSN-L"],"pl":["ISSN-L"],"universal":["ISSN-L"]}},{"label":{"en":["Related Identifier"],"pl":["Powiązany identyfikator"]},"value":{"en":["ISSN-L: 2084-4093"],"pl":["ISSN-L: 2084-4093"],"universal":["ISSN-L: 2084-4093"]}},{"label":{"en":["Resource Type"],"pl":["Typ zasobu źródłowego"]},"value":{"pl":["Czasopismo"]}},{"label":{"en":["Date copyrighted"],"pl":["Data zastrzeżenia praw autorskich"]},"value":{"en":["2018"],"pl":["2018"],"universal":["2018"]}},{"label":{"en":["Abstract"],"pl":["Abstrakt"]},"value":{"en":["In a unionized Cournot duopoly with decentralized, firm-level bargaining, this note re-examines the endogenous equilibrium agendas (wage vs. efficient bargaining) that can arise under three different specifications of the timing of negotiations and the impact of the outcome of the bargaining process on social welfare. Given that explicit conflict of interest among the bargaining parties can arise in every timing specification, this note proposes, analyzes, and discusses some guiding principles for governments and public authorities interested in pursuing social welfare improvements."]}},{"label":{"en":["Autor opisu"],"pl":["Autor opisu"]},"value":{"en":["WR U/PAdjm"],"pl":["WR U/PAdjm"],"universal":["WR U/PAdjm"]}},{"label":{"en":["Alternative title"],"pl":["Tytuł odmienny"]},"value":{}},{"label":{"en":["Role"],"pl":["Rola"]},"value":{"pl":["Machaj, Mateusz : Redaktor","Dybał, Mariusz : Redaktor"]}},{"label":{"en":["License"],"pl":["Licencja"]},"value":{"en":["Making materials available on the basis of the agreement with the owner of the property copyrights"],"pl":["Udostępnianie na podstawie umowy z właścicielem majątkowych praw autorskich"]}},{"label":{"en":["Access rights"],"pl":["Prawa dostępu"]},"value":{"en":["The use of this material is allowed only with accordance of applicable rules of fair use or other exceptions provided by law, and any broader use requires the permission of the authorized entity"],"pl":["Korzystanie z tego materiału jest możliwe zgodnie z właściwymi przepisami o dozwolonym użytku lub innych wyjątkach przewidzianych w przepisach prawa, a korzystanie w szerszym zakresie wymaga uzyskania zgody uprawnionego"]}},{"label":{"en":["Detailed Type"],"pl":["Szczegółowy typ zasobu"]},"value":{"en":["article"],"pl":["artykuł"]}},{"label":{"en":["Location of original object"],"pl":["Lokalizacja oryginału"]},"value":{"pl":["Biblioteka Wydziału Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii"]}},{"label":{"en":["Place of publishing"],"pl":["Miejsce wydania"]},"value":{"en":["Wrocław"],"pl":["Wrocław"],"universal":["Wrocław"]}},{"label":{"en":["PLMET"],"pl":["PLMET"]},"value":{"en":["https://docs.psnc.pl/spaces/FBCMETGUIDE/overview"],"pl":["https://docs.psnc.pl/spaces/FBCMETGUIDE/overview"],"universal":["https://docs.psnc.pl/spaces/FBCMETGUIDE/overview"]}},{"label":{"en":["Resource 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