Subject and Keywords:
Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 28 June 2016, file ref. act SK 31/14, changed the normative content of, inter alia, art. 64 § 1 point 4 and art. 64 § 6 of the Act of 17 June 1966 on enforcement proceedings in administration, derogating them to the extent that they do not specify the maximum amount of the fee for enforcement activities performed. As a consequence, determining the amount of the enforcement fees has become highly complex. The provisions challenged by the Constitutional Tribunal have not been removed from the legal system. At the same time, the legal system lacks the limit of enforcement fees postulated by the Tribunal. In the jurisprudence of administrative courts, there is a wide spectrum of views on the proper model of applying art. 64 § 1 point 4 of the Act on and art. 64 § 6 of the Act. On the one hand, this fact confirms the complexity of the discussed matter, on the other hand, it indicates the emergence of a state of ‘legal uncertainty.’ This article presents and discusses the basic models of interpretation of the provisions questioned by the Court. At the same time, it was indicated that special attention should be paid to the concept assuming the need to supplement the lack indicated by the Constitutional Tribunal by means of applying inference based on analogy. The source on the basis of which the conclusions from the analogy were made are the provisions of the enforcement act regulating the amount of the property occupation fee. This model ensures the fullest implementation of the guidelines formulated by the Constitutional Tribunal. On the one hand, it protects the interests of the individual, and on the other hand, it does not deprive the enforcement apparatus of financing. At the same time, it introduces a method of adjusting enforcement fees based on predictable, verifiable and repeatable criteria, which meets the requirements of the principle of citizens’ trust in the state.