Object structure

PLMET:

click here to follow the link

Title:

Wage versus efficient bargaining in a Cournot duopoly: A Preliminary Note on Welfare

Creator:

Buccella, Domenico

ORCID:

0000-0002-9594-0630

Subject and Keywords:

efficient bargaining ; wage bargaining ; union–duopoly bargaining agenda ; social welfare

Description:

Od 2013 pt.: Ekonomia - Wroclaw Economic Review

Abstract:

In a unionized Cournot duopoly with decentralized, firm-level bargaining, this note re-examines the endogenous equilibrium agendas (wage vs. efficient bargaining) that can arise under three different specifications of the timing of negotiations and the impact of the outcome of the bargaining process on social welfare. Given that explicit conflict of interest among the bargaining parties can arise in every timing specification, this note proposes, analyzes, and discusses some guiding principles for governments and public authorities interested in pursuing social welfare improvements.

Place of publishing:

Wrocław

Publisher:

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego

Contributor:

Machaj, Mateusz. Red. ; Dybał, Mariusz. Red.

Date issued:

2019

Identifier:

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2084-4093.25.1.2

Language:

ang

Relation:

Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, ISSN 0239-6661 ; no 3905. Ekonomia, ISSN 2084-4093 ; 25/1, s.23-34

Is version of:

Czasopisma Naukowe w Sieci (CNS)

Rights holder:

© Copyright by Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego Sp. z o.o., Wrocław 2018

Autor opisu:

WR U/PAdjm