

XENOPHON ON EMOTIONS IN THE *SYMPOSIUM* AND THE *APOLOGY*

by

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ABSTRACT: After presenting the reasons for undertaking an analysis of the *Symposium* and the *Apology* with regard to emotions, I focus on the groups of pleasure/joy and love/friendship and discuss relevant contexts. They provide us with a complex picture which I then try to interpret by means of a concept of hierarchy. Next, I touch upon on the issue of the expression of emotions. Finally I show why and how the *Symposium* and the *Apology* may be helpful in the study of emotions.

1. INTRODUCTION

Within the growing body of secondary literature devoted to emotions, more and more ancient Greek philosophers have been discussed. But Xenophon's *Symposium* and his *Apology* have not yet been considered for that purpose. A recent study by Melina TAMIOLAKI examines φίλια, ἐλπίς, φθόνος, and ἡδονή in the *Cyropaedia* with a focus on the political role of emotions (TAMIOLAKI 2016). In David KONSTAN's chapter, though it promises in its abstract to draw, among others, on historical and philosophical works by Aristotle and Xenophon (see KONSTAN 2016), Xenophon is mentioned only twice and in a general way: KONSTAN introduces a quote from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, respectively III 5, 5–6 and I 2, 24, with a short comment of his own. As it is, neither the *Symposium* nor the *Apology* have been considered with a view to analysing emotions¹. I am of the opinion that even if these two works are incomparable in size and importance with Plato's and Aristotle's corpuses, this is not a reason to omit them.

A more positive reason for engaging in this kind of research is that the *Symposium* and the *Apology* abound in terms denoting emotions. Obviously,

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¹ In a recent paper on Xenophon's *Symposium*, G. DANZIG (2017: 146) mentions in two subsequent paragraphs “a simple contrast between love of the soul and love of the body”, and then “an emotional, even erotic, relationship, despite the lack of sexual relations”, when speaking about the lover and the boy (in 8, 25–27).

Xenophon does not provide any direct opinion pertaining to emotions, nor does he express a particular thesis concerning them, let alone formulate a theory of emotions². But from the way he uses words such as *τέρψις*, *πόθος*, *τόλμα*, *ὀργή*, we may infer what fear, longing, joy and anger meant for him, and what he thought about the emotions these words represent. Since there is no other way of knowing about this than relying on the contexts in which the words are found in the two works, my strategy will be to present as many relevant passages as possible³.

2. AFFECTIVE THEMES IN THE *SYMPOSIUM* AND IN THE *APOLOGY*

Xenophon's *Symposium* is almost half the length of Plato's work of the same title and his *Apology* is one third of the length of Plato's. Both, however, deploy emotions and their vocabulary in a meaningful way.

I would like to start with the genera of emotions. If any definition, description or classification is present, one may infer that this involves also an awareness of affectivity as a separate family. Taxonomy also deals with issues more basic than those connected with the epistemology, ontology or axiology of affectivity. Moreover, it demonstrates the intricacy, if there is any, of affectivity in a direct manner. In the case of Xenophon's *Symposium* and the *Apology*, two groups are best represented. These are pleasure/joy and love/friendship. In my opinion, the relevant contexts provide us with a view that both genera are complex.

The distinction between the species of the pleasure/joy⁴ genus is clearly made in the discussion on the etymology of the name of Ganymede, where the pleasures of the body are firmly set apart from those of the soul: οὐχ ἡδυσώματος ὀνομασθεῖς ὁ Γανυμήδης ἀλλ' ἡδυγνώμων (8, 30)⁵. The same applies to the distinction between material and spiritual goods, insofar as the well-being provided by the market is opposed to the more agreeable one stemming from the soul: Τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μὲν τὰς εὐπαθείας ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πολυτελεῖς πορίζεσθαι,

² I think that the expression "a theory of emotions" is too frequently abused. We are often told about a philosopher holding a theory of emotions. But a theory of emotions is not a set of implicit claims contained in his works (however important they may be), or observations which can be converted into explicit claims. I take a theory to be a more or less developed system which not only describes but, first of all, explains issues related to the topic of which it is a theory.

³ The Greek text follows F. OLLIER (1961/1995). The passages from the *Symposium* are accompanied, when necessary, by A.J. BOWEN's translation (= AJB), those from *Apology* by O.J. TODD's (= OJT).

⁴ I say "pleasure/joy" (and, similarly, "love/friendship") because there is no commonly recognised name for the genus. This is one of the major problems of the taxonomy of emotions and probably concerns most of the affective genera.

⁵ "His name meaning not bodily sweet but mentally sweet" (AJB).

ἐμὲ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνευ δαπάνης ἡδίους ἐκείνων μηχανᾶσθαι (18)⁶. In the latter passage that distinction turns out to be clear-cut: the pleasures of the soul are internal and independent of the external⁷. In the subsequent discussion on bad pleasures overcoming a person (19: ἄλλης πονηρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἡττημένον)⁸, a hierarchy emerges which presupposes that other pleasures are good – though no examples are given in this context. We come across remarks about enjoying food and drink (4, 8: δεῖπνον [...] ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καλλίαν ἐλθόντας ἡδυπαθεῖν⁹) and finding pleasure/joy in drinking wine (31: ἀλλ' ὁ νεανίσκος ἡσθεῖς οἶνω¹⁰). All these examples refer, without doubt, to bodily pleasures.

On other occasions we are told about what is surely non-bodily pleasure/joy (and if it is non-bodily, we may assume that it is most probably a kind of mental pleasure/joy). The most explicit example of this is given in 4, 41 where ἡδυπαθεῖν is related not to the body but to the soul (ὅταν ἡδυπαθεῖν βουληθῶ, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰ τίμια ὠνοῦμαι, πολυτελὴ γὰρ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι¹¹). In 4, 49, the object of enjoyment is a moral quality: virtue (οἱ θεοί, ὡς ἔοικε, καλοκάγαθία ἡδονταί¹²)¹³. Even if we should be sceptical about this example as it is the gods who are the subject of the feeling, its object is important nonetheless: enjoying someone's excellence is surely not a bodily kind of pleasure/joy because to enjoy it one first needs to conceptualise what excellence is and then to recognise it. More to the point, such a case supports the clear-cut distinction between physical and mental pleasure/joy because enjoying one's virtue does not affect both body and mind, but only, or at least significantly, the mind of the one who recognises the excellence¹⁴. Because moral qualities are not material in the way that items in the market are,

⁶ “While other men get their delicacies in the market and pay a high price for them, I devise more pleasurable ones from the resources of my soul without cost” (OJT).

⁷ What may be meant by the external and the internal is illustrated in the following: φύσει βασιλικόν τι κάλλος εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἂν μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης (1, 8; AJB: “beauty is something naturally regal, especially if its possessor combines it with modesty and good sense”). There is a physical and ethical aspect of beauty, the former visible from the outside and the latter by the eyes of the soul, so to speak. Compare μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς in Plato, *Phaedrus* 253d.

⁸ “Overcome by any other base pleasure” (OJT).

⁹ “...dinner [...] we had a pleasant experience of it coming to Kallias” (AJB, modified).

¹⁰ “The young man, delighting in wine” (OJT). Wine also calms and improves the mind. See 2, 24, quoted below.

¹¹ “When I want a fine time of it, I don't go to the market for its luxuries (they're expensive); I go instead to the cupboard of my soul” (AJB).

¹² “The gods also take pleasure in a moral beauty” (AJB, modified).

¹³ Examples are also included in the *Apology*: Socrates' friends should be cheerful because he is doing well (27: ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὡς εὐπραγοῦντος ἐμοῦ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν εὐθυμητέον εἶναι); Socrates will face death cheerfully and die (cheerfully) (33: ἀλλ' ἱλαρῶς καὶ προσεδέχετο αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπετελέσατο).

¹⁴ Unless one wants to suggest that this is so because one is affected physically by excellence, say, gets a better condition of life and only then is inclined to think of it as of moral excellence.

it is not the body but the mind which is affected. Hence the opposition between the pleasure/joy provided by external goods and the pleasure/joy provided by internal or moral features. And there is no one in the *Symposium* and the *Apology* who prefers the former to the latter¹⁵.

Another testimony to the body–psyche distinction of pleasure/joy comes from the domain of sight and hearing. We are told, for example, about the pleasures/joys of performance (3, 2: Οὔτοι μὲν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἱκανοὶ τέρπειν ἡμᾶς φαίνονται¹⁶). But what kind of pleasure/joy they are? Pleasure/joy is produced not because of looking at a nice picture, such as a sunny or peaceful view affecting the eyes delicately as opposed to a sudden and strong flash harming them and causing them to shut it out. And it is not produced by hearing a pleasant sound as opposed to an irritating noise either. Pleasure/joy is rather an outcome of the meaning of the spectacle which, as such, must be comprehended, and also a result of the musical composition which is more than the sum of pleasant sounds. For it may be the case that a pleasant composition includes a sound which, when taken in isolation, is unpleasant. In the last section of the *Symposium* we read: Εὐθύς μὲν γὰρ ἡ Ἀριάδνη ἀκούσασα τοιοῦτόν τι ἐποίησεν ὥς πᾶς ἂν ἔγνω ὅτι ἀσμένῃ ἤκουσε· (9, 3)¹⁷. One might wonder whether Ariadne felt pleasure/joy on hearing particular sounds, or whether it was because she recognised a melody she liked. In the latter case her enjoyment would be indirectly linked to the pleasantness of the sounds and would result from hearing what she liked to hear¹⁸.

In Xenophon's *Symposium* we find more passages related to pleasure/joy in the realm of seeing. There is the pleasure/joy of watching a performance (7, 2: ἡμεῖς δ' ἂν μάλιστα εὐφραίνοίμεθα θεώμενοι αὐτούς¹⁹), the pleasure/joy of looking at acrobatics which is not felt, when the sense of the show (the risk involved?) is not grasped (7, 3: θαῦμα μὲν ἴσως τί ἐστίν, ἡδονὴν δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα

But then, since he first feels physically affected and only after that conceptualises the cause-effect relation, physical pleasure/joy would be devoid of the often admitted cognitive character.

¹⁵ The body/mind distinction is also drawn for kinds of desire. Compare the desire to learn (8, 28: Ἐπιθυμῶ δέ σοι, ὦ Καλλία, καὶ μυθολογεῖν) and the desire for the body (8, 23: ὁ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ὀρεγόμενος εἰκότως ἂν ὥσπερ πτωχὸς περιέποιτο). The latter, we are told, amounts to beggary or, as in the *Apology*, to slavery (16: Τίνα μὲν γὰρ ἐπίστασθε ἥττον ἐμοῦ δουλεύοντα ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαις;).

¹⁶ “These people [i.e. musical performers] are clearly competent to give us enjoyment” (AJB).

¹⁷ “Ariadne heard the music [and] she reacted in such a way that anybody would have known she was delighted with what she heard” (AJB).

¹⁸ But what about a mixture of the beauty of young people and sounds which calms displeasure and provokes love (3, 1: αὕτη ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν τε παίδων τῆς ὥρας καὶ τῶν φθόγγων τὰς μὲν λύπας κοιμίζειν, τὴν δ' ἀφροδίτην ἐγείρειν)? Is beauty in this case a simply pleasant view or should it be conceptualised in order to give pleasure?

¹⁹ “We have the greatest pleasure watching them” (AJB).

δύναμαι γινῶναι τίν' ἂν παράσχοι²⁰), a performance providing spectators with pleasure/joy (7, 5: ἐγὼ εἰσάξω θεάματα ἐφ' οἷς ὑμεῖς εὐφρανείσθε²¹).

Different and more complex is the passage about seeing a beloved person (4, 22: ἡ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὄψις εὐφραίνειν δύναται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ εἰδῶλου τέρψιν μὲν οὐ παρέχει, πόθον δὲ ἐμποιεῖ²²). This is, again, a picture offered by Xenophon, although he makes no explicit claim about joy or its absence or about longing. However, what he observes invites one to think about the following three elements:

- (i) seeing the beloved *may* provide joy (εὐφραίνειν δύναται),
while
- (ii) the image of the beloved *does not* provide the lover with delight,
but
- (iii) *does* produce a longing.

As it is, there seems to be no symmetry between a possible occurrence of pleasure/joy in the case of the presence of the beloved on the one hand and a necessary occurrence of longing and a necessary absence of pleasure/joy in the case of the absence of the beloved person on the other. This amounts to no symmetry between the cause of joy and that of longing which is not necessarily surprising insofar as joy and longing are not opposite in character. If there were any analogy it would rather be a distinction between the presence of a person and his/her presence represented by an image and a distinction between joy and longing. As a consequence, longing emerges as an image or shadow of joy. This may be true, since longing is not entirely pleasant²³. But the main question is: while the presence of the beloved *may* or *may not* provoke joy, why *does* his/her absence *always* provoke longing and not only *may* provoke it? Why is the presence in the image modally stronger than the presence in the flesh? And is this true of any image, however remote and blurred it may be? According to Xenophon, the vision (εἰδῶλον) in mind must be clear: σαφῶς ἔχω εἰδῶλον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (4, 21). It is clear enough to render the lover able to make a sculpture or painting of the beloved which closely resembles him. And, as has already been said, the fact that this is a remembrance of an image and not the real view of the beloved does not affect the quality of the painting or sculpture. This shows a difference between the realm of acting or producing and the realm of affectivity: while a clear image has as much strength as the original in making a painting

²⁰ "A bit of a stunt too perhaps, but what pleasure even that could give I cannot decide" (AJB).

²¹ "I'll bring on a show that you people will enjoy" (AJB).

²² "It's the sight of him himself that has the power to make me happy [...] whereas the sight of my image of him only sets up a longing; there's no pleasure in that" (AJB).

²³ Compare Aristotle's (*Rhet.* 1378b) approach to anger which is not entirely unpleasant: "Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain [...] always accompanied by a certain pleasure" (transl. by J.H. FREESE).

or a sculpture possible (and similar), this is not so in bringing joy about: possible joy has a parallel in an unavoidable longing²⁴. A copy is strong enough to produce a painting or a sculpture, yet it is not strong enough to produce joy. If this is so, longing would seem to be a weakened form of joy.

A similar distinction of kinds of pleasure/joy applies in the domain of hearing. For instance, one is pleased by hearing another person (3, 13: Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅπαντες ἡσθέντες, ὅτι ἤκουσαν αὐτοῦ φωνήσαντος προσέβλεψαν²⁵), which may refer either to the pleasure/joy of hearing an agreeable voice or to the pleasure/joy of hearing what he or she says (or usually says) or how that person usually speaks. If the latter is meant and if pleasure/joy is based on understanding of the content of one's speech, then it is mental pleasure/joy. But it may be the former too, since in another passage words are (made) pleasant when accompanied by (musical) sounds (6, 4: τοὺς σοὺς λόγους ἡδύνεσθαι ἄν τι ὑπὸ τῶν φθόγγων²⁶)²⁷. Finally just as Socrates praises the pleasure/joy of the soul more than that of the body, so he insists that he and his companions provide themselves with pleasure/joy instead of relying on performers: οὐκ αἰσχροὺς οὖν εἰ μὴδ' ἐπιχειρήσομεν συνόντες ὠφελεῖν τι ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἀλλήλους; (3, 2)²⁸. If we agree that being autonomous in finding pleasure/joy is a hard, i.e. qualitative and not quantitative, criterion, then we obtain two different species or sub-kinds of pleasure/joy: pleasure/joy whose cause is independent of the subject and pleasure/joy the cause of which is dependent on the subject.

More examples could be quoted, but I believe the above suffices to make a claim that there is a variety of types of pleasure/joy in Xenophon and that this variety testifies to the multi-layered nature of pleasure/joy. What is certain is that there is a distinction between physical and mental pleasure/joy, and a third layer of bodily-cum-mental pleasure/joy should most probably be taken into account as well. With the third layer, however, we avoid too strong a dichotomisation.

²⁴ The passage in question can be compared with a famous passage from Plato's *Phaedrus* about the vision (or eye, or image) of love (253e5: ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα) and the pangs of longing (253e6–254a1: γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου κέντρων ὑποπλησθῇ) because of a similar link between seeing and longing. If the *Phaedrus* is later than Plato's *Symposium*, and Plato's *Symposium* is later than Xenophon's *Symposium*, then the picture in question is prior to the *Phaedrus* passage.

²⁵ "Everyone was delighted they had heard him speak" (AJB).

²⁶ "Its [i.e. aulos'] notes would give a little sweetness to your words" (AJB, modified). AJB renders τοὺς σοὺς λόγους as "your conversation" (similarly OJT: "your discourse", but OLLIER: "tes paroles"). If this be the case, pleasure/joy is not purely sensual, but probably mainly intellectual insofar as it requires a comprehension of the discourse. See other examples above.

²⁷ Even if Socrates' remark is a tease, such an improvement is not improbable.

²⁸ "Won't it be a shame, then, if we don't even attempt to give each other some benefit or pleasure now we are together?" (AJB). This is what is going to happen: ἐπιδειγμάτων ἀμελοῦντας, ἀλλήλοις δὲ ἡδομένους (6, 6; AJB: "people ignoring what he had to show and were enjoying their own company instead").

It also helps to account for some cases in which it is unclear how to draw a distinction between the purely bodily and the purely mental. For instance: Ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἡ αὐλητρὶς μὲν ἠΐλησεν, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἐκισθάρισε, καὶ ἐδόκουν μάλα ἀμφοτέρω ἱκανῶς **εὐφραίνειν** (2, 2)²⁹. In this case pleasure/joy may well be both of the sensual type (because of the nice sound) and of the intellectual type (because of the fine composition), a kind of pleasure/joy combined or merged at the same time. On the other hand we have passages about mental states that are modified by organic substance. We are told that τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ὁ οἶνος ἄρδων τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς μὲν **λύπας**, ὥσπερ ὁ μανδραγόρας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, κοιμίζει, τὰς δὲ **φιλοφροσύνας**, ὥσπερ ἔλαιον φλόγα, ἐγείρει (2, 24)³⁰. There must therefore be a conviction that a material factor (wine) influences – calms and awakens – mental functioning or mental feelings³¹. Manifestly – and this is the point critics may want to focus on – no full panorama of affective genera is exemplified in Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Apology*. Accordingly it would be more correct not to extend this kind of conclusion to the whole of affectivity (or, if so, to do this with appropriate caution).

Having said that, I would now like to see if the claim about the multi-layered nature of pleasure/joy is valid for other genera of affectivity and I like to think that the more varied my examples are, the stronger the claim about the multi-layered nature of given genera of affectivity will be. It is a lucky coincidence that in Xenophon the genus of love/friendship is well represented³², because it differs significantly from the genus of pleasure/joy³³. And here is the reason. Generally, I think, we could distinguish three kinds of affectivity in view of its activity and passivity. They correspond broadly – but not exactly – to the grammatical distinction of voices. Accordingly:

(i) passive affectivity – most often discussed in literature, e.g. being afraid, being angry, etc. (these are states which are results of an action which is not itself an emotion, e.g. terrifying, provoking, etc.),

²⁹ “The aulos-player played her aulos for them, and the boy played his kithara, and they both appeared to be making a good contribution to people's enjoyment” (AJB).

³⁰ “Wine irrigates the spirit; it soothes irritability as mandragora soothes people, and it rouses thoughts of friendliness as oil does a fire” (AJB).

³¹ We are even told that in what concerns the provision of liquid human bodies function the same as plants (2, 25: τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν σώματα ταῦτα **πάσχειν** ἄπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν γῇ φυομένα), but then that bodies and judgments (may) err (2, 26: τὰ σώματα καὶ αἱ γνώμαι **σφαλοῦνται**).

³² Interestingly, in Xenophon's *Symposium* all the main Greek words pertaining to love/friendship are there: not only ἐράω (e.g. 8, 23) and φιλέω (e.g. 8, 23) but also ἀγαπάω (8, 23) and στέργω (8, 21).

³³ The list of pleasure/joy words in the *Symposium* and the *Apology* includes also: ἡδονή and ἡδομαι (+ ἡδυπαθέω, ἡδυσώματος, ἡδυγνώμων) as well as συνήδομαι, τέρψις and τέρπω, εὐφραίνω, εὐπάθεια, εὐθυμητέον, ἱλαρῶς, and ἄσμενος.

(ii) intransitive affectivity – the above examples of pleasure/joy, e.g. rejoicing (always active),

(iii) transitive affectivity which is both active and passive, e.g. love and being loved, admire and being admired, etc. (this is what makes it the most paradigmatic case of affectivity).

If this classification is acceptable³⁴, it means that by taking into consideration love/friendship I turn to a different kind of affectivity than pleasure/joy. And if the same consideration concerning multi-layeredness can be made regarding the genus of love/friendship as has been the case for the genus pleasure/love, its validity will be all the more clear.

Let me then focus on the love/friendship (ἔρως/φιλία) genus. The bulk of the relevant passages are contained in Socrates' speech. To tell the truth they are quite numerous and can hardly all be commented on in this paper. What I want to stress is the following:

(i) There is the love of body and the love of soul, which are clearly distinguished from one another. Both may co-exist (8, 14: ἄν δὲ καὶ ἀμφοτέρω στέργωσι³⁵), but one may also occur independently of the other and even be opposed to one another (8, 6: τὸν μὲν σὸν ἔρωτα κρύπτωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἔστιν οὐ ψυχῆς ἀλλ' εὐμορφίας τῆς ἐμῆς³⁶). This recalls the above-mentioned distinction concerning the external or physical and internal or ethical aspect of beauty, which provides two different kinds of pleasure/joy. Then, if affection depends on the body alone, it fades away as soon as the body fades away (8, 14: ἀπολείποντος δὲ τούτου ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φιλίαν συναπομαραίνεισθαι³⁷). One may also think about an explicit passage about two distinct Aphrodites (8, 9–10: Εἰ μὲν οὖν μία ἔστιν Ἀφροδίτη ἢ διτταί, Οὐρανία τε καὶ Πάνδημος, οὐκ οἶδα [...]. Εἰκάσαις δ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἔρωτας τὴν μὲν Πάνδημον τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιπέμπειν, τὴν δ' Οὐρανίαν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων³⁸). And, as in the case of pleasure, a hierarchy is introduced: καὶ πολὺ κρείττων ἔστιν ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ὁ τοῦ σώματος ἔρως (8, 12)³⁹. This may not only be a question of arbitrary preference, but first of all of their essential nature. For instance,

³⁴ See ZABOROWSKI 2018.

³⁵ "If the affection is both physical and spiritual" (AJB).

³⁶ "It's not a passion for my soul but for my good looks" (AJB).

³⁷ "When that [i.e. the flower of youth] departs inevitably the friendship withers away too" (AJB). Compare (Ps.-)Plato, *Alcib.* I 103a (its very beginning).

³⁸ "Whether there is one Aphrodite or two, Celestial [Ourania] and Popular [Pandemos], I do not know [...]. One could suggest that Pandemos sends the passion for bodies and Ourania sends the passions for souls and friendship and fine deeds" (AJB). The distinction is similar to Plato's, see *Symposium* 180d–e (in Pausanias' speech).

³⁹ "...a spiritual passion is much better than a physically based passion" (AJB).

(ii) love of the soul is more insatiate than love of the body. This is because the former is purity (8, 15: ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία διὰ τὸ ἀγνὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀκορεστοτέρα ἐστίν⁴⁰), whereas love of the body may be satisfied (8, 15: Καὶ μὴν ἐν μὲν τῇ τῆς μορφῆς χρήσει ἔνεστί τις καὶ κόρος, ὥστε ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὰ σιτία διὰ πλησμονήν, ταῦτα ἀνάγκη καὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ πάσχειν⁴¹). Satiation is a feature of the material domain⁴², while the object of spiritual love is immaterial and therefore can never be satisfied. Moreover, a relationship based on the love of the body instead of the soul is slavish (8, 23: Ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀνελεύθερος ἡ συνουσία τῷ τὸ σῶμα μᾶλλον ἢ [τῷ] τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαπῶντι, νῦν τοῦτο δηλώσω⁴³). We are also told that not only men but gods and heroes also respect spiritual friendship more than corporeal intimacy (8, 28: οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωποι ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἥρωες τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φιλίαν περὶ πλείονος ἢ τὴν τοῦ σώματος χρήσιν ποιοῦνται⁴⁴).

(iii) We get a fine exposition of what love – more exactly, to being loved mutually (κοινὸν τὸ φιλεῖσθαι) – is like. The description runs thus:

Οἷς γε μὴν κοινὸν τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἡδέως μὲν προσορᾶν ἀλλήλους, εὐνοϊκῶς δὲ διαλέγεσθαι, πιστεύειν δὲ καὶ πιστεῦεσθαι, καὶ προνοεῖν μὲν ἀλλήλων, συνῆδεσθαι δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσι, συνάχθεσθαι δὲ ἂν τι σφάλμα προσπίπτῃ, τότε δ' εὐφραϊνομένους διατελεῖν, ὅταν ὑγιαίνοντες συνῶσιν, ἂν δὲ κάμῃ ὁπότερος οὖν, πολὺ συνεχεστέρα τὴν συνουσίαν ἔχειν, καὶ ἀπόντων ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ παρόντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; (8, 18)⁴⁵

⁴⁰ “Spiritual love, however, is all the more insatiable because of its purity” (AJB).

⁴¹ “In the exploration of beauty there is actually a certain satiety, so that inevitably you feel for your beloved what overeating makes you feel for food” (AJB).

⁴² And the same works for physical pleasure/joy, which is bigger when superposed on a desire: Καὶ πολὺ πλείον διαφέρει πρὸς ἡδονήν, ὅταν ἀναμείνας τὸ δεηθῆναι προσφέρωμαι (4, 41; AJB: “it makes a lot of difference to the enjoyment when I come to something after feeling the need for it”), while this is not the case with mental pleasure/joy. Moreover, physical – but not mental – pleasure/joy may be too intense: Καὶ πάντα τοίνυν ταῦτα οὕτως ἡδέα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ὥς μᾶλλον μὲν ἡδεσθαι ποιῶν ἕκαστα αὐτῶν οὐκ ἂν εὐξαίμην, ἥττον δέ· οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ ἔνια αὐτῶν ἡδίω εἶναι τοῦ συμφέροντος (4, 39; AJB: “All of this seems to me so pleasurable that in each bit of it I wouldn’t pray for more pleasure but less: some of it seems so much more pleasurable than is appropriate”).

⁴³ “I will now demonstrate that the companionship of a man who loves physically rather than spiritually lacks the dimension of freedom” (AJB).

⁴⁴ “Not only men but also gods and heroes treat spiritual friendship as more important than a physical relationship” (AJB).

⁴⁵ “When people have friendship in common, isn’t it inevitable that they look at each other with pleasure, and talk to each other positively, and establish mutual trust, and take thought for each other, and share enjoyment when their actions prosper and annoyance if some slip intervenes, and sustain their delight when they both share good health, and if either falls ill the relationship they have is more durable, and they mind about each other even more when they’re apart than when together?” (AJB).

Such a description seems to make Xenophon a representative – an early one indeed – of the so-called cluster theory of love, which does not reduce love to only one necessary and sufficient constituent. This view sees love rather as a set of constituents which may vary depending on the form, but in each case a minimal set of elements is required⁴⁶. According to Xenophon, love is such a cluster of nine elements which, in order to constitute love – more exactly, mutual love (κοινὸν τὸ φιλεῖσθαι) – must occur together and which include the following:

- (a) having pleasure/joy in seeing each other,
- (b) speaking in a well-disposed way,
- (c) trusting and being trusted,
- (d) mutual caring for one another,
- (e) rejoicing together in success,
- (f) grieving together in case of failure,
- (g) constantly enjoying each other's company when in good health,
- (h) spending even more time together when one is ill,
- (i) caring about one another even more in absence than when together.

All of them taken together are what constitutes love. If one element is amiss, there is no mutual love. But since, according to the cluster theory of love, the elements are replaceable, one may suggest that if, for instance, there is no (a), (b) and (c), then there may be other elements instead. Or even instead of two elements such as say (a) and (b), there may be one other, which is not listed and could be labelled (k)⁴⁷. Xenophon is not that explicit in his *Symposium*. But in the light of our topic, i.e. emotions, it is interesting to see that of the nine constituents of love, five – or even eight if you agree that trust (c) and care (d, i) are also affective acts – are themselves emotions (pleasure, being well disposed or kind, common joy, common sorrow, enjoying). And Xenophon introduces the idea which in current debates on emotions is called a meta-emotion: loving friendship (8, 18: ἅμα ἐρῶντες τῆς φιλίας⁴⁸).

(iv) There is also a distinction between several modalities of love in the *Symposium*: apart from loving (this is the initial and active form of love; see

⁴⁶ See e.g. SCHMIDT 2018: 717 f.: “Perhaps romantic love could be defined through a (partially) variable cluster of properties [...] of, let us say, 15 conditions – none of which is either *necessary* or *sufficient* – and say, for example, that seven of these conditions must be present in any case of romantic love. [...] We could thus list the characteristic 15 features *a* to *o* (union, concern, trust, affection, shared feelings, desire, jealousy, attractiveness, the wish to spend time together, permanence, etc.), and if at least seven elements from this set, whatever they may be, perhaps *a* to *g* or *i* to *o*, are present, one would be justified in speaking of romantic love. In this sense, there could be cases of love which exhibit no common properties, apart from precisely possessing seven (different) features from the given pool”. I think this solution may be used *not only* for romantic love *but* for any form/kind of love.

⁴⁷ For possible examples, see the previous footnote.

⁴⁸ “Still passionate about their friendship” (AJB).

several examples above), Xenophon speaks about being loved (9, 6: εἰ φιλεῖ αὐτόν [...] ἢ μὴν τὸν παῖδα καὶ τὴν παῖδα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φιλεῖσθαι⁴⁹)⁵⁰ and also about returning love (8, 19: Τὸν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος κρεμάμενον διὰ τί ἀντιφιλήσειεν ἂν ὁ παῖς;⁵¹). If one recalls Plato's *Lysis*, one must acknowledge that the paradigm is better represented in Plato since it involves all four modalities: loving, being loved, loving in return, and being loved in return⁵². Yet, it may be that Xenophon simply did not have enough room in his narrative to introduce the fourth modality. After all, how is one to speak about being loved in return if the lover loves not the beloved but his or her body? If the lover is to be loved by the object of his love in such a case, he should be loved by his lover's body, which makes no sense at all. This is why it is fair to reiterate the fact that Xenophon mentions ὁ Νικήρατος, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω, ἐρῶν τῆς γυναικὸς ἀντερᾶται (8, 3)⁵³, where ἀντερᾶται (literally: "he is loved in return") may be accepted as a parallel to the absent form ἀντιφιλεῖται.

Several scholars are sceptical as to whether we may establish which of the two *Symposia* was written first⁵⁴. But as for emotions, I believe the order in which they were written does not matter, for if Xenophon followed Plato, it would mean that he shares Plato's opinion concerning the nature of love. There is however one point in Xenophon which is different to that which is said by Plato. In Plato's allegory in the *Phaedrus* the white (or the good) horse is not called θυμοειδής, even though for many scholars it represents τὸ θυμοειδές of the *Republic*. Furthermore, the white horse controls himself (*Phdr.* 254a: ἐαυτὸν κατέχει). But Xenophon speaks about τοὺς θυμοειδεῖς ἵππους as opposed to τοὺς εὐπειθεστάτους⁵⁵. The meaning of the word and, more importantly, the concept of τὸ θυμοειδές is entirely different. It looks as if for Xenophon affectivity – if it were to be

⁴⁹ "...if she loved him [...] the boy and girl were really in love with each other" (AJB).

⁵⁰ On being loved, see also 8, 18: κοινὸν τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, quoted above.

⁵¹ "But if the man is all dependent on the physical, why should the boy love him back?" (AJB).

⁵² See Plato, *Lysis* 212c4: ὁ μὲν φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλεῖται (transl. by W.R.M. LAMB: "the one loves and the other is loved") and also 212c1–d5: ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι [...] ἀντιφιλοῦν (transl. by W.R.M. LAMB: "being loved reciprocally [...] loving reciprocally").

⁵³ "Nikeratos, who's in love with his wife [...] and she with him" (AJB).

⁵⁴ E.g. OLLIER 1995: 30: "Les ressemblances entre le *Banquet* de Xénophon et celui de Platon sont nombreuses et frappantes. [...] nous ne savons pas du tout à quel moment a été composée [l'œuvre] de Xénophon. [...] Cependant l'on peut estimer [...] que les vraisemblances sont plutôt en faveur de la priorité de Platon". But see THESLEFF 1978: 168: "our present text of Xenophon's *Symposium* consists of two layers: a brief earlier version from the 380s which gave some impulses to Plato's *Symposium*, and a later version (including chapter 8), influenced by Plato and written in the later 370s" and DANZIG (2005), who offers more arguments to support THESLEFF's conclusion.

⁵⁵ 2, 10: τοὺς ἵππικοὺς βουλομένους γενέσθαι οὐ τοὺς εὐπειθεστάτους ἀλλὰ τοὺς θυμοειδεῖς ἵππους κτωμένους (AJB: "people who want to be horse-trainers pick not the most docile animals but the most spirited").

identified with τὸ θυμοειδές – lacked the autonomy it is given by Plato in the chariot allegory.

Although the domain of affectivity is not as fully represented in the two works in question by Xenophon as it is in Plato or Aristotle, one still finds other kinds of emotions and emotion-related words in them, for instance the basic distinction between *fear about* (4, 52: δέδοικα περὶ αὐτοῦ⁵⁶) and *fear of* (2, 19: ἔδεια μὴ μαίνοιο⁵⁷). There are also remarks about one of most intellectual⁵⁸ of emotions, surprise/amazement. Its object is what is seen (7, 4: μάλα τὰ παρόντα θαυμάζειν) or heard (8, 24: Εἰ δὲ λαμυρώτερον λέγω, μὴ θαυμάζετε), and it presupposes that the meaning of what is seen or heard is grasped mentally. Xenophon's vocabulary of emotions comprehends also rarer lexemes. For instance, in the *Apology* there is an occurrence of εὐπάθεια (18, quoted above), a word that made a brilliant career thereafter (in Plato it is attested once in the *Phaedrus* (247d, verbal form), and thrice in the *Republic* (347c, verbal form, 404d and 615a)). We also meet εὐθυμητέον (27, quoted above), a verbal adjective of a verb related to εὐθυμία, so characteristic of Democritus (see e.g. DK 68B174; DK 68B189; DK 68B191; Plato uses εὐθυμος in *Laws* 792b and εὐθυμέομαι in *Rep.* 383b and 797b).

There are also other affective themes in Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Apology*. I would like to briefly mention two of them. First, according to Xenophon, emotions can be manifested. Xenophon speaks about four of them manifested either in facial expressions or in the voice. These are respectively, friendly feelings and hostile feelings when it comes to facial expressions⁵⁹ and modesty and boldness in the case of the voice⁶⁰. Several further questions arise here: are these manifestations necessarily accompanying an occurrence of love/friendship and hatred, or are they only a possibility? If the latter, on what does it depend as to whether love/friendship or hatred is manifested or not? Can manifestations be faked and if so, do they then differ from genuine expressions of emotions? Xenophon does not give any answers to these questions, but observations similar to his are discussed nowadays in the literature on emotions.

⁵⁶ "I am worried about him" (AJB).

⁵⁷ "I was afraid you were going mad" (AJB). See also 5, 8: δέδοικα γὰρ τὸν σὸν καὶ Ἀντισθένης πλοῦτον μὴ με καταδυναστέυσῃ (AJB: "I'm fearful in case that wealth of yours and of Antisthenes may countervail against me").

⁵⁸ It is considered to be intellectual probably because it is hard to conceive of a sensual surprise or amazement. In the *Theaetetus* (155d) it is regarded by Plato as the beginning of philosophy.

⁵⁹ 4, 58: Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἐπιστάμεθα, ὅτι ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ ἐχθρῶς πρὸς τινὰς βλέπειν; (AJB: "Do we understand also that it's possible to look at people in a friendly way and in a hostile way with the same set of eyes?").

⁶⁰ 4, 58: Τί δέ; τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ ἔστι καὶ αἰδημόνως καὶ θρασέως φθέγγεσθαι; (AJB: "And that it's possible to speak both politely and aggressively with the same set of vocal organs?").

Another point, which to some extent is the reverse of the previous one, is that emotions – the examples given by Xenophon are hatred and love/friendship – may be manipulated through speeches⁶¹. Unless hatred and love/friendship are understood vaguely or superficially as feelings of a preference-against and a preference-for, I can hardly see how hatred and love/friendship may be produced by spoken words alone. Do words themselves suffice to bring about hatred or love/friendship? If so, it would be a surprising idea of hatred and love/friendship assuming that no act or action is required to build them up.

3. CONCLUSION

In my paper I have pointed to passages which show Xenophon's treatment of affectivity, even if it is only an accessory and has no philosophical conceptualisation. I do not claim that Xenophon had any notion of the transitivity or intransitivity of affectivity, the taxonomy or distinction of affective genera. He probably had more to say about (a theory of) love/friendship⁶². Given the number of contexts the result looks rather like a kind of hypothetical reconstruction. Xenophon's observations makes it possible to propose the following:

(a) there is a variety of species within two genera of emotions; what I mean by a variety is that affectivity in general or even its subsets (e.g. pleasure/joy, love/friendship) can hardly be treated *en bloc*; it is more accurate to take into consideration various classifications within several types, sub-types, or sub-sub-types of affectivity,

(b) this kind of variety is better understood as a three-layered hierarchy in the case of pleasure/joy and two-layered hierarchy in the case of love/friendship,

(c) the corollary of this is that nothing can be said about the value of the family as such: a family of emotions is neither good nor bad; this is because within the family there are various genera and within genera some species of pleasures/joys and loves/friendships are useless or even harmful, while others are beneficial⁶³,

(d) a germ can be distinguished of what is known today as a cluster theory of love,

(e) the issue of manifestations of emotions is touched upon.

It is important to underscore that, it seems to me, one may find and does find a support in the *Symposium* and the *Apology* for any of the above claims. Once

⁶¹ 4, 58: Τί δέ; λόγοι οὐκ εἰσὶ μὲν τινες ἀπεχθανόμενοι, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ πρὸς φιλίαν ἄγουσι; (AJB: "And are there not some things said which incur hatred and some which are conducive to friendliness?").

⁶² See e.g. his *Memorabilia*, esp. II 6.

⁶³ On a more general level, of the two exclusive claims – either affectivity is bad and should be extirpated or affectivity is good and should be strengthened – neither is accurate. A similar reluctance to a (general) valuing of affectivity may be inferred from Plato's dialogues (see ZABOROWSKI 2012).

again, these points are presented by Xenophon neither explicitly nor strictly philosophically, let alone analytically. But for someone who works within the philosophy of affectivity rather than within the history of philosophy, it may be interesting to see how these ideas emerge in the work of Xenophon.

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