Eos CVII 2020
ISSN 0012-7825
DOI: 10.34616/e.2020.65.85

LUCAN'S USE OF CAESAR'S *COMMENTARII*: SOME REMARKS ON LUCAN. V 461–475 AND CAES. *BCIV.* III 18–19

by

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ABSTRACT: In scholarship on Lucan, more and more emphasis is being placed on the connection of his poem with Caesar's *Commentarii de bello civili*. It is argued that the *Civil War* remains in constant interaction with Caesar's text. This article aims to analyse one example of such interaction by undertaking a juxtaposition and a close reading of Lucan. V 461–475, the narrative about the two armies encamped on the river Apsus in Epirus, and Caes. *BCiv*. III 18–19. These two sections are firmly connected by common motifs that do not appear together elsewhere, a similar order of narrative episodes, and the strong commitment of the narrator. The first part of the article focuses on how Lucan debunks Caesar's propaganda and at the same time creates another one, expressed by his narrator. In the second part, an attempt is made to show that Lucan's text is more complex and that it includes other voices, which also undermine the epic narrator's fervent utterances.

In a dissertation from 1874, G. Baier stated that Livy's lost books (*Per*. 109–112) were Lucan's only source as far as historical events are concerned[1]. Also J.P. Postgate, in his commentary to Book VII from 1896, considered *Ab urbe condita* as Lucan's sole source and did not see any evidence in the book he commented for the poet's having made use of Asinius Pollio or Caesar[2]. The opinion put forward by Baier and Postgate was developed by R. Pichon in his book from 1912 which was entirely devoted to the problem of the poem's sources[3]. The thesis was recently revisited by J. Radicke in his extensive monograph on Lucan's poetic technique[4]. Contrary to Baier's opinion, however, Lucan could have used

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[1] Baier 1874: *passim* (conclusions: p. 46).

[2] Postgate 1896: XII f. He repeated it in the commentary to Book VIII: Postgate 1917: XI f.

[3] Pichon 1912: *passim*.

[4] Radicke 2004: esp. pp. 34–39. The scholar, adopting the view (shared by Baier 1874: 5) that Cassius Dio also largely relied on the *Ab urbe condita*, compares appropriate passages from the *Civil War* to those from Dio's *History of Rome.* However, the Severan historian did not have to rely on Livy after all – for example, Cremutius Cordus is identified as his source in the narrative about the conflict between Caesar and Pompey (e.g. Westall 2016: 148 f.); Dio, of course, could have used various texts simultaneously (see the remarks of Pelling 1982 and Kemezis 2016: 243 f.). Radicke (2004: 38) also explains the parallels between the poem and Caesar by referring to the character of Lucan's source – Livy.

many sources, including Caesar's *Commentarii de bello civili*[5]. E. Griset (1954), H. Haffter (1957), M. Rambaud (1955 and 1960) even concluded that Lucan's poem is a direct response to the *Commentarii de bello civili*[6]. The insights of the aforementioned scholars were developed most broadly by J. Masters in his influential book based on an earlier dissertation[7]. The view that Lucan's poem continuously interacts with Caesar's narrative was more recently supported by such scholars as A. Zissos and T.A. Joseph[8].

In this article, following the thesis that Lucan's poem is a response not only to Vergil's *Aeneid*, but also to the *Commentarii de bello civili,* I discuss a short passage from Book V, lines 461–475, and two chapters (18 and 19) from Caesar's Book III to show how Lucan works with Caesar's material[9]. At first glance, Lucan's text, while keeping and transforming the main motifs of the *Commentarii*, builds a narrative with the opposite overtone of propaganda and creates a narrator who clearly supports the other side in the war. The common motifs are also shaped in such a way that they become Lucan's recurring themes. The lines from Lucan's *Civil War*, however, are much more complex and multi-dimensional than Caesar's chapters. Apart from the narrator's voice, we also hear other, different voices in them.

The Lucan passage is placed immediately after the account of Caesar's crossing to Epirus, to the coast manned by Pompey's army, and on the landing at Palaestae: "Palaestinas uncis confixit harenas" (V 460). Generally speaking, they inform the audience that the leaders established their camps very close to each other. However, the fight does not yet start at this point. Neither do the leaders meet to begin the

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[5] A brief summary of the discussion: Lintott 1971: 488 f., n. 6.

[6] See also Lounsbury (1975), who, following Rambaud (1955 and 1960), shows that the episode on Domitius in Lucan's Book VII (599–616) is a re-telling of Crastinus' speech in Caesar (*BCiv.* III 91) "according to Pompeian terms" (p. 212). Interestingly, Postgate, in the introduction to his commentary on Lucan's Book VII (1896: XII), wrote: "if within the present book he made any use of the narrative of Caesar, it was certainly only for the purpose of contradicting it". But the author of the commentary did not go beyond the schematic thinking typical for *Quellenforschung* and did not consider constructing narrative in opposition to another narrative as the use of a source. Holliday (1969: 71–73) quotes Postgate and gives several examples which can attest that Lucan, after all, used Caesar in Book VII in the "traditional" way.

[7] Masters (1992: 216–259 [chap. 7]) also expanded Haffter's remarks on the fact that both Lucan's poem and Caesar's text end at almost the same point. He concluded that the poem, which ends abruptly at the fights in Egypt, is a finished work, but this opinion was met with criticism. Leigh (1993: 220) in his review of Masters' book writes: "M[asters] closes with a final chapter arguing that the *Pharsalia* is complete as it stands. This is simply self-indulgent and silly, and should not have been included".

[8] Zissos 2013; Joseph 2017a: 298–303 and 2017b. Writing about the ending of the poem, Zissos (pp. 148 f.) adopted a balanced position – Lucan quit his work at a moment similar to that when his (anti)model ended, but he most probably did not intend to finish the poem this way.

[9] The connection between these passages has been pointed out by Bachoffen (1972: 28), who carefully compares the texts of Caesar and Lucan, but does not discuss them.

peace talks. The lines constitute an introduction to the two longer episodes depicting Caesar and Pompey in the camps. Caesar, impatient with the tardiness of Mark Antony in Brundisium, first urges him, and then slips away from the camp at night and secretly attempts to cross the Adriatic Sea, but is stopped by a storm (476–702). But soon the much-awaited legions under Antony's command arrive from Italy (703–721). We are then transferred to Pompey's camp. Seeing the opponent's armies united, he feels forced to take up the fight and sends his wife Cornelia to Lesbos for safety (722 ff.). The book ends with Cornelia's departure (770 ff.). First we see Caesar's reaction to the tardiness of his commander, then Pompey's reaction to the fact that the troops have at last arrived from Brundisium.

Caesar's narrative on the events between the landing in Epirus and Antony's crossing with the rest of the army, which can be juxtaposed with Lucan. V 461–475, extends in Book III to a number of chapters (6–19) and is exceptionally detailed[10]. Lucan, however, is very brief. After depicting Caesar's landing in Epirus, he immediately goes on to the armies encamped opposite each other. The lines that interest us consist of the *ekphrasis* of the place where the opponents have set up their camps (461–467), a presentation of how the world reacts to the situation (until 472), and finally the apostrophe addressed to Pompey and predicting his death (472 ff.):

> prima duces iunctis vidit consistere castris
> tellus, quam volucer Genusus, quam mollior Hapsus
> circumeunt ripis. Hapso gestare carinas
> causa palus, leni quam fallens egerit unda;
> at Genusum nunc sole nives nunc imbre solutae
> praecipitant. neuter longo se gurgite lassat,
> sed minimum terrae vicino litore novit.
> hoc fortuna loco tantae duo nomina famae
> conposuit, miserique fuit spes inrita mundi
> posse duces parva campi statione diremptos
> admotum damnare nefas; nam cernere voltus
> et voces audire datur, multosque per annos
> dilectus tibi, Magne, socer post pignora tanta,
> sanguinis infausti subolem mortemque nepotum,
> te nisi Niliaca propius non vidit harena.
>
> (Lucan. V 461–475)

The leaders and their camps are physically close. During the blockade of Brundisium a year earlier (II 610 ff.) they were separated by walls; Pompey occupied the well-fortified city, whereas Caesar tried to block his exit through the seaport. Here – according to Caesar himself – they are separated only by a small river, the Apsus (*BCiv*. III 13, 5 f. and 19, 1). But Lucan removes even that barrier. The Apsus together with the nearby river Genusus surround only the

[10] For the events from Book III presented in the form of a chronological table, see Raaflaub, Ramsey 2017: 198–201 and 2018: 187–191.

area where the armies are stationed (this change will be discussed below). They are therefore free either to fight a battle or to try and reach an agreement. It is a key moment during the conflict, so the narrator and his commentary move to the foreground of the text. The *ekphrasis* itself, the description of the two very different rivers, is metaphorical and characterises the leaders, their personalities and their attitudes towards the war; it constitutes the continuation of the *synkrisis* from Book I (129–157), where Pompey, unaccustomed to war, seeking only approval, resembles a revered oak towering over other trees. This oak is, however, old, withering, and bound to fall with a stronger gust of wind (120–143), whereas Caesar is a lightning destroying everything in its path and striking even its own temples ("in sua templa furit", 155). The Genusus, which rushes down, swollen with snow and rain, depicts Caesar, while the Apsus, slow and calm, represents Pompey (similar images appear repeatedly in the poem, constituting its conceptual framework of sorts)[11]. Ships may sail it, which benefits the people, as opposed to the savage and destructive power of the neighbouring river. Lines 466–467, closing the *ekphrasis* and presenting the shortness of both rivers, once again emphasise how close the camps are to each other (and are continued in line 470: "duces iunctis vidit consistere castris" [461] ~ "minimum terrae vicino litore novit" [466] ~ "duces parva campi statione diremptos" [470]).

The following lines, 469–472, include a focalisation of the people of the world[12]. Its indicator is hope, *spes* (469). Everybody expected that the leaders, who can see and hear each other, would renounce the war and condemn *nefas*. The hope is described by the narrator as vain (*irrita*), and the world has the modifier *miser* attached. However, the *ekphrasis* immediately imposes an interpretation on the audience, suggesting who is responsible for the war and why those hopes were unfulfilled. The languid Apsus, carrying the ships, would probably be willing to fulfil the hopes of the world, but Caesar, the wild Genusus, destroys everything in his way. Moreover, the narrator goes beyond narration itself, using the apostrophe to openly point to the guilty party. The apostrophe is addressed to Pompey, but the main figure is Caesar. He is the person who is acting and the subject of *vidit* (475), which continues the *vidit* from the beginning (461). According to the narrator, Pompey focuses on the past and his feelings – he loved his father-in-law for so many years, and he, in spite of their strong and tragic family bonds (Julia died in childbirth, and the baby soon followed[13]), will only see him on the sands of the Nile. Caesar is depicted (not directly, but

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[11] On the Apsus and the Genusus, see Schönberger 1960: 87; Radicke 2004: 338 f. On the image of the leaders from the *synkrisis*, which permeates the entire poem, see e.g. Rosner-Siegel 1983.

[12] On the focalisation in V 469 ff., see Ludwig 2014: 119.

[13] Vell. Pat. II 47; Cass. Dio XL 44, 3. The sex of the baby is uncertain (Plut. *Pomp*. 53, 4: καὶ τεκοῦσα θῆλυ παιδίον; Cass. Dio XXXIX 64, 1: θυγάτριον; Vell. Pat. II 47 – *filius*; Suet. *Iul.* 26 – *nepos*). It was a second child of Pompey and Julia (Plut. *Pomp*. 53, 4: αὖθις μέντοι κυήσασα).

a contrario) as devoid of any familial feelings and striving only to settle matters with his son-in-law. The world watches the leaders, but according to the narrator's interpretation they do not see each other, because Caesar refuses to do so. Lucan's readers very well knew what that meeting would have looked like. In the narrative sense it is a prolepsis, a foretelling of the events portrayed in Book IX, where Caesar will be presented with his son-in-law's head (1010–1062)[14].

The apostrophe supplements the *ekphrasis* and the image of the leaders from lines 461–475 is continued in the two aforementioned episodes in the camps. The narrator, in a certain sense responding to the potential doubts of his audience, immediately explains what has been stopping Caesar from dealing with Pompey right away. He clearly accuses his father-in-law of a crime (*scelus*): "Caesaris attonitam miscenda ad proelia mentem/ ferre moras scelerum partes iussere relictae" (V 476–477)[15]. His thoughts were paralysed by his thirst for war, and he could not bear the delay caused by Antony. He pushed for the crime like the swollen Genusus rushing downstream. He even decided to attempt the risky crossing of the Adriatic in order to hasten the fight with his son-in-law. Pompey, on the other hand, delaying the battle, "poaching" fate's time ("blandaeque iuvat ventura trahentem/ indulgere morae et tempus subducere fatis", V 732–733), resembles the slow Apsus drawing its waters from a swamp. In the scene of the farewell to Cornelia, he is guided primarily by his feelings, this time for his second wife.

Let us look at the *Commentarii* and compare it with Lucan. Caesar crosses the Adriatic Sea and lands in the Ceraunian Mountains (*BCiv*. III 6, 1)[16]. He quickly starts working towards peace, first trying to negotiate with Pompey through Vibullius Rufus, a Pompeian prefect whom he meets after the crossing (III 10). Vibullius was chosen as a messenger because he was twice Caesar's prisoner of war and was twice released (at Corfinium and in Spain). When Pompey arrives at the shore and cuts off the opponent from Dyrrachium, Caesar pitches his camp by the river Apsus, where he intends to wait for the legions that remain in Italy, and then to spend the winter there. Pompey fixes himself on the other

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[14] Cf. V 473–474 with IX 1048–1049: "nunc mixti foedera tangunt/ te generis? nunc gnata iubet maerere neposque?"

[15] *Scelus* is also Pompey's death: "fidem vidit sceleris", IX 1037; "huncine tu, Caesar, scelerato Marte petisti/ qui tibi flendus erat?", IX 1047–1048.

[16] He came to Palaeste: "ad eum locum, qui appellabatur Palaeste" (III 6, 3); in Lucan we have: "Palaestinas [...] harenas" and this name does not appear anywhere else in the narratives on the civil war. However, we should bear in mind that *Palaeste* is a conjecture introduced to the *Commentarii* by Glandorpius on the basis of Lucan's text to replace *Pharsalia*, which is attested in all the manuscripts. However, a testimony stating that *Palaeste* appeared in one of the manuscripts exists, see: *C. Julii Caesaris Opera omnia ex editione Oberliniana cum notis et interpretatione in usum Delphini, variis lectionibus, notis variorum, J. Celsi commentariis &c. &c., recensu editionum et codicum et indice locupletissimo accurate recensita*, vol. 4, Londini 1819, p. 1447: "Paullus Marsus testatur se in Ms. Chalcidensi reperisse *qui appellatur Palaeste*."

shore (III 13, 5–6). Caesar continuously tries to negotiate. He starts talking to Bibulus (the main commander of the Pompeian fleet) and Libon, who just wants to gain some time (III 15–17). As has already been said, chapters 18 and 19 (whose action takes place among the soldiers by the river Apsus) are crucial here. Part one of Lucan's passage V 461–467 – the leaders' profiles in the form of the metaphorical *ekphrasis* – correspond to the ending of chapter 18 and to the beginning of chapter 19, parts two and three – the men's wishes resulting from the fact that the camps are located next to each other and the prediction (in the form of the apostrophe) of the continuation of the war and Pompey's beheading – to the next chapter.

Chapter 18 is a summary of Caesar's efforts to broker peace, which he undertook after his arrival in Epirus. In this chapter, when the situation has calmed down a little ("sedato tumultu, quem repentinus adventus Caesaris concitaverat", III 18, 3) Vibullius finally finds an opportunity to fulfil his mission. He chooses three helpers whom Pompey used to consult – Libon is among them, which does not bode well. Pompey interrupts after the first few words, forbidding the messenger to speak further, and concludes: "Quid mihi, inquit, aut vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit, cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum, reductus existimabor bello perfecto" (III 18, 4). Vibullius himself owed his life and freedom to the *beneficium Caesaris*, but Pompey does not want to make it seem that he, too, is alive thanks to the good will of his enemy. Caesar, of course, could not have known what had happened in Pompey's camp, but he says he learned about the events from the people present during the conversation (maybe from Vibullius) and, more importantly, he adds that in spite of all this he nevertheless tried to work towards peace in other way – through peace talks (see below): "conatus tamen nihilo minus est aliis rationibus per colloquia de pace agere" (III 19, 6).

In the *Commentarii*, as in Lucan's *ekphrasis*, we have a juxtaposition of the two generals, their characters and their approaches towards the war – the violent, rabid Pompey, who does not even want to listen to the end of Vibullius' message, and to whom defeating his rival is all that matters, and the patient Caesar, who is still, in spite of numerous obstacles, trying to work towards peace and who starts thinking about war and preparing for it only when he has no other option left (after unsuccessful negotiations with Libon: "Quem ubi Caesar intellexit [...] ullam spem aut condicionem pacis afferre, ad reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit", III 17, 6). In this way Caesar unambiguously makes Pompey guilty of the escalation of the conflict even before initiating actual warfare. Lucan's metaphorical description is therefore a reversal (at least at first glance) of these characteristics. Caesar's portrayal in the poem resembles the image of Pompey in the *Commentarii.* In addition, Lucan's Pompey also takes action when his opponent forces him to do so. At the end of Lucan's Book V, after Antony's arrival, he sends his beloved wife away from the camp to Lesbos for safety, recognising

that the clash is inevitable ("summa videns duri Magnus discrimina Martis/ iam castris instare suis", Lucan. V 723–724).

In the basic sense, Lucan's *ekphrasis* still indicates that the camps are located close to each other in the vicinity of the Apsus and Genusus rivers. The lines therefore correspond directly to the beginning of Caesar's chapter 19, which starts with the reiteration of the information that the camps are only separated by the river Apsus. "Inter bina castra Pompei atque Caesaris unum flumen tantum intererat Apsus crebraque inter se colloquia milites habebant" (*BCiv*. III 19, 1). Lucan manipulates the facts by adding another river and giving his lines a metaphorical dimension, because he wants to include in them his response to the end of Caesar's previous chapter. In Cassius Dio and Appian, the troops are separated by the river Apsus and Alor respectively (Cass. Dio XLI 47, 1; App. *BCiv*. II 56[17]), but the separating function of this natural barrier is more accentuated (cf. App. *BCiv*. II 58 and Cass. Dio XLI 47, 2–3). Besides, both historians do not mention any soldiers hoping for peace or trying to talk to each other. Quite the contrary, since according to Appian some skirmishes took place by the river (*BCiv.* II 56). The motif of negotiations among soldiers is also absent from the shorter texts of Velleius Paterculus and Florus as well as Plutarch's biographies of Caesar and Pompey[18].

The proximity of the armies, which is underlined at the beginning of Caesar's chapter 19, allowed the soldiers to converse with each other (*colloquia*). During those talks no missile was shot because of the pact between the two sides ("per pactiones loquentium"). The previous chapter ended with a general statement on Caesar's actions towards peace *per colloquia*. We immediately know that the author of the *Commentarii* will try to make use of those conversations (in Lucan, thanks to the *ekphrasis*, the audience knows why the talks did not take place). He does not get involved in an evident way, but sends his legate Vatinius to canvass for peace – the troops listened to his words in silence (III 19, 3), which naturally emphasises their wish to stop the war. Aulus Varro answers him and the parties decide to meet the next day in order to agree how to guarantee the messengers' safety. Great crowds from both camps gather, demanding peace: "Quo cum esset postero die ventum, magna utrimque multitudo convenit, magnaque erat exspectatio eius rei, atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur" (III 19, 5). The tone of that sentence is strengthened by the anaphora *magna ... magnaque* supplemented with the adjective *omnium*. Pompey's reaction at the end of the

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[17] The name of the river may be Appian's negligence or an error already present in his source or perhaps a scribe's mistake; on Appian's errors in the narrative on the civil wars, see Stevenson 2015: 264–266.

[18] The text by Velleius Paterculus is very brief (II 51). After Caesar lands in Epirus, we almost immediately move to the events at Dyrrachium (51, 2): "primo paene castris Pompei sua iungeret, mox etiam obsidione munimentisque eum complecteretur". We can assume that the first part of the quote refers to the camps by the river Apsus; see Woodman 1983: *ad loc*.

previous chapter allows us to guess at this point just how those talks are going to end. In Lucan's V 468–472[19], however, we do not have troops who are talking to each other, but the whole world watching the leaders who could see and hear each other, and hoping for peace. Caesar's "magnaque erat exspectatio" and "omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem" turn into *spes inrita mundi*. The soldiers on the river are active, they try to negotiate with each other, so they can expect (*exspectatio*) to influence their leaders, even force peace on them. The whole world can only watch passively and have empty wishes, hopes (*spes*). The transition from soldiers to the whole world is an extension typical for Lucan, consistent with the first words of the poem: "Bella per Emathios plus quam civilia campos...". A civil war is a global conflict, it involves everyone, and nobody can escape from it (which is illustrated by Appius' history recounted at the beginning of Book V – lines 67 ff.); it is *mundi ruina* (II 253; IV 393; V 637; X 150). Lucan starts the *ekphrasis* with the Earth and flowing rivers which first saw the leaders garrison next to each other (*tellus – vidit*); from this anthropomorphised Earth we move to the world of men – the rivers become leaders, *tellus* transforms into the entire human world (and so into the soldiers as well) which watches the leaders (for *spectaculum* see below).

In Caesar's chapter 19, the leaders are not officially present by the river, but Caesar acts in the background through Vatinius. Pompey, on the other hand, hides behind his commander of the cavalry, Titus Labienus. When the peace talks begin, Labienus steps out of the crowd of the Pompeians (although we would rather expect the aforementioned Aulus Varro to do so) and starts arguing with Vatinius: "summissa oratione loqui de pace atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit" (III 19, 6)[20]. Pompey's officer, who has previously been in Caesar's army, plays the villain in the C*ommentarii*. In Book III he first appears in chapter 13. When Pompey was quickly heading towards the coast, his march might have seemed like a retreat. When he finally stops in order to put up a camp (by the river Apsus), his men are terrified. Then Labienus steps out and swears that he will not desert him, no matter what fortune may bring, setting an example to others: "iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset" (III 13, 3). Now he appears for a second time and can be perceived as Pompey's messenger due to his fanatical devotion to the new commander (his behaviour corresponds to Pompey's words from the previous

[19] Vitelli (1902: 410) pointed out that it is an allusion to the talks between the Pompeians and the Caesareans, but in his study he opted for Livy's tradition; he even considered the description of the rivers Apsus and Genusus to have been drawn from Livy: "La descrizione dei due fiumi [...] deriva senza dubbio da Livio. Nei vv. 469–71 [...] è verisimilmente un'allusione alle trattative di pace, annodate in quest'occasione appunto fra Cesariani e Pompeiani, e andate a vuoto: cfr. Ces. III, 19".

[20] The phrase *summissa oratione* is debatable; for a discussion on the proposed corrections, see Damon 2015: 244 f.

chapter)[21]. We witness the confrontation of the leaders, but only through intermediaries. Lucan, transforming Caesar's text, accentuates that lack of a direct meeting – here, the leaders, not the troops, are in the foreground, but in spite of everyone's hopes, they do not face each other. Besides, whereas Caesar in the *Commentarii* portrays himself as a *spiritus movens* of the negotiations and *de facto* the most important figure, Lucan assigns a prominent place to Pompey and his feelings – it is him that the narrator addresses in the apostrophe.

When Labienus starts arguing with Vatinius, missiles suddenly start being fired "from everywhere" – "mediam orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa" (III 19, 7). *Undique* is to be understood as from everywhere on the Pompeian side, as only Caesar's soldiers and his centurions are wounded. Labienus' outburst closes the chapter and ends the peace talks – peace will come when Caesar's head is brought to them: "desinite ergo de compositione loqui; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest" (*Civ*. III 19, 8). Chapters 18 and 19 parallel each other to a certain extent. In both chapters Caesar exploits the situation to negotiate peace, in both the talks are abruptly terminated, both end with statements quoted in direct discourse – the first statement is by Pompey, the second by his legate; it may even be said that these two enunciations complement each other: that by Labienus follows up, in a way, on his leader's speech and expresses what was left unspoken there. The pronoun *nobis* is also worth noting: Labienus, representing the leader, speaks for all the Pompeians, ignoring the wishes of the troops crowded by the river. In this way Pompey's image is further worsened – he becomes almost a tyrant, imposing his will on others. Vatinius, campaigning for peace, asks if citizens are not allowed to send delegations to citizens and lists fugitives and bandits, who can send their messengers, as examples: "liceretne civibus ad cives legatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo praedonibusque licuisset" (III 19, 2). These words (in reported speech) concern Pompey in a veiled way and should be read in the context of his very negative reaction to Caesar's own proposals that Vibulius tried to present. The fugitives are most probably the remnants of Sertorius' army, the bandits – Cilician pirates. Pompey defeated them and received messengers from them (they were resettled)[22]. Once he was able to talk to the enemies of Rome, but now, with Labienus' help, he does not allow the citizens (*cives*) to come to him for peaceful negotiations. Therefore he treats them in a worse way than

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[21] He later appears in chapter 71, after the battle of Dyrrachium, and kills the prisoners of war whom Pompey has passed on to him ("quo maior perfugae fides haberetur", III 71, 4); he also makes a speech before the battle of Pharsalus, undermining the strength of Caesar's armies (III 87). For Labienus in the *Commentarii* see Batstone, Damon 2006: 106–109; Peer 2015: 32 f. (Labienus in Book I), 145–147 (in Book III).

[22] Carter 1993: *ad loc*.; on the pirates' legation and their resettlement – Plut. *Pomp*. 28; on the Sertorians' delegation – Plut. *Sert*. 27, 1; the Sertorians' resettlement: Hier. *Adv. Vigil*. 4 Migne; discussion: Pina Polo 2009: 283–286.

enemies, aliens or outcasts. The roles of good and evil are reversed in the poem, the apostrophe is a response both to the speech put into the mouth of Labienus, ending the chapter in Caesar, and to the words attributed to Vatinius, where accusations are levelled against Pompey as an opponent of negotiations. Directing his attention to the leaders themselves, Lucan evokes one of the key motifs of his poem (introduced in the proem: "cognatasque acies", I 4): the civil war is not only a struggle of citizens against citizens, but also a war within a family. Caesar's Pompey is supposed to act against his fellow citizens, while Lucan's Caesar even acts against someone with whom he was bound by family ties. The apostrophe V 472–475 recalls the past too (as Vatinius does in chapter 19). Pompey's love for his father-in-law lasted for many years, but it seems that Caesar never had any good feelings for his son-in-law. In the *Commentarii*, Pompey used to do the right thing; in the poem, on the other hand, no image is evoked of Caesar behaving in a good way in the past.

Both the lines by Lucan under discussion and chapter 19 end by foretelling the only way the fight between the leaders will finish – when the loser's head is brought to the winner. It must be emphasised that there is no similar motif in any other narrative of the military operations on the Epirotic coast in 48 BC. The readers of the *Commentarii* were quite familiar with history, and Labienus' necessary condition of peace, which epitomises the cruelty of the Pompeians, could have been full of tragic irony: in Caesar's interpretation, it was precisely his insane desire to be first in Rome and his hatred towards the enemy that led Pompey to be beheaded by his petty client king. Interestingly, Caesar only here obliquely tells the reader about the sole "face-to-face" encounter with his rival during this war. Pompey, whose mouthpiece at the moment is Labienus, bears the blame for this horrible meeting. Caesar did not mention the events at Pelusium in detail. The treacherous murder of the great Roman general is depicted briefly: "naviculam parvulam conscendit cum paucis suis; ibi ab Achilla et Septimio interficitur" (III 104, 3)[23]. Recounting his arrival in Alexandria, he only writes that he learned there about the death of Pompey: "Alexandriae de Pompei morte cognoscit..." (III 106, 4). That is all. Then he focuses on the crowd of Egyptian soldiers who were hostile towards him, because the *fasces* offended the king. The head of his enemy is an important motif in our other sources. In Cassius Dio, when Caesar arrives in Alexandria, he finds the people upset over Pompey's death. He is shown the head and the ring of the murdered one before he disembarks. Only

[23] The variations in depicting Pompey's death in different sources are discussed by Bell, Jr. 1994; on Caesar's version: "We should not be surprised at this brevity. It is in keeping with Caesar's nature and was expedient for someone who was trying to unite the Roman world behind himself. There was no need to dwell on this unpleasant incident and thus inflame the passions of those still loyal to Pompey" (p. 831). See also, in the context of Caesar's style and in comparison to Appian's extensive narrative, the remarks of Batstone, Damon 2006: 27 f. ("Caesar's account [...] is effective").

then does he bravely (θαρσούντως) land on the shore. Because the *fasces* incite hostility, he must find refuge in a palace (XLII 7, 2–3). According to Appian, he did not want to see the head that was brought to him, and ordered it to be buried (*BCiv*. II 90; 86 – Pompey's murder); similarly in Plutarch (*Caes*. 48; *Pomp*. 80, 5) he turns away at the sight of the head, and when they bring him the signet ring, his eyes well up with tears[24]. In lines V 472–475, Lucan foreshadows this very event, which will be recounted in Book IX, and simultaneously engages in intertextual play with the *Commentarii*, accusing Caesar of what the Pompeians were accused of. Pompey's father-in-law himself led to the decapitation of his daughter's husband and did not even mention it. In Book IX, Caesar first watches and makes sure the crime has been committed, and only then starts acting like a good father-in-law (Pompey was a good son-in-law in V 472–473), he turns his eyes away and sheds false tears: "non primo Caesar damnavit munera visu/ avertitque oculos; voltus, dum crederet, haesit;/ utque fidem vidit sceleris tutumque putavit/ iam bonus esse socer, lacrimas non sponte cadentis/ effudit...", IX 1035–1039). The apostrophe from Book V finds its continuation in the apostrophes from Book IX: 1043–1046, addressed to Pompey, and 1047–1062, addressed to Caesar; in the second apostrophe family connections again are referred to: "nunc mixti foedera tangunt/ te generis? nunc gnata iubet maerere neposque?" (1048–1049). In book V, the narrator tells Caesar about of his son-in-law's feelings and suggests that the addressee is devoid of love for his daughter's husband; in Book IX, the victor, who pursued Pompey with wicked warfare and watched the battlefield of Pharsalus with dry eyes, is openly accused of the lack of *pietas* ("quisquis te flere coegit/ impetus, a uera longe pietate recessit", 1055–1056). Interestingly, when Caesar, after seeing the head of his son-in-law, finally gains confidence and begins to speak, Lucan, in the voice of the narrator, describes his words as fraudulent and deceptive: "nec non his fallere vocibus audet/ adquiritque fidem simulati fronte doloris" (1162–1163). So in the passage that directly responds to Caesar's text the audience of the *Civil War* is referred to the scene in which Caesar is depicted as "an artful deceiver"[25]. Lucan thus appears to undermine Caesar's credibility as the narrator of the *Commentarii* who poses as a great defender of peace.

The motifs that are common to the *Commentarii* and their similar arrangement (armies located next to each other, opportunity for the warring parties to hold talks, hopes for peace that get ruined by one of the leaders who only wants to defeat his adversary, the prediction of the beheading as the only way to end the conflict) clearly indicate that Lucan constructed his lines whilst having Caesar's

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[24] Flor. II 13, 55: "Ptolemaeus [...] foedus amicitiae cum Caesare medio Pompei capite sanxisset"; Velleius Paterculus is silent about the dreary encounter of the generals in Alexandia, but he devotes a lot of space to Pompey's death itself (II 53–54).

[25] The phrase is that of Tracy 2014: 141.

work before him[26]. The most important thing that brings Lucan's and Caesar's texts together is undoubtedly the bias and the subjectivity of the message – the contrasting portrayals of the leaders and the opposed engagement of the narrator. Caesar portrays himself as benevolent, sparing his enemies, bestowing benefits, striving for peace and reconciliation right after landing in Epirus. He is quick to present a negative image of the Pompeians as a whole, as well as of Pompey himself. The untrustworthy Libon and Bibulus are shown in a particularly bad light. The latter is also characterised by his extraordinary cruelty[27]. In chapter 8 of Book III, not only had he already burn a part of the ships sent to Italy by Caesar, together with their owners and sailors, but he even went as far as condemning to death Pompey's civil allies, the passengers on the ship which sailed from Brundisium to Oricum: citizens and slaves, including minor boys (III 14, 3)[28]. Vibullius, who does not rush to speak to Pompey, is not a particularly positive character either[29]. Finally, Pompey himself and his officer Labienus, his *alter ego* in chapter 19 – they are impulsive and fierce, wanting only war and defeating the enemy. Such extreme polarisation of the leaders and their goals is also present in Lucan V 461–475, in the narrator's voice, and is later developed in the scenes taking place in the camp. In the texts by Appian, Dio, and even Florus, the leaders are not contrasted in such an extreme way, and their approach to the conflict itself is similar[30]. There is no separation into a leader who pushes for

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[26] This does not mean, naturally, that the poet did not reach for some other sources. Quite the contrary, he might have and probably did use narratives that were critical to Caesar or sympathetic to Pompey, like probably Livy (Hayne [1990: 442] finishes her article on Pompey's portrayal in Livy with: "Livy, it seems, deserved his epithet Pompeian"). Caesar himself does not mention the attempt to secretly cross the Adriatic to Brundisium. However, the story was widely popular (Val. Max. IX 8, 2; Plut. *Caes*. 38; Suet. *Iul*. 58; Florus II 13, 37; Appian *BCiv*. II 56–58; Cass. Dio XLI 46). All these passages are compared by Matthews 2008: 307–314 (Appendix I). According to her, Lucan probably relied on Livy (p. 307). Westall (2018: 201) believes that the story might have been created by the biased, anti-Caesarian T. Ampius Balbus (his bias can be seen in a passage from Suet. *Iul*. 77 = *FRHist* 34, F1).

[27] For the Pompeians and their cruelty in Caesar's *Civil War*, see e.g. Batstone, Damon 2006: *passim*; Osgood 2019: 147–150. The Pompeians as barbarians: Grillo 2012: 106–130 (chapter "The Barbarization of the Enemy"); Johnston 2017: 91 f.

[28] Carter 1993: 156 (ad 14, 3) doubts the veracity of the event. For Bibulus in Book III of the *Commentarii de bello civili*, see Peer 2015: 144.

[29] The character and his mission is analysed in terms of irony by Grillo 2012: 28–32 ("Caesar's irony targets the whole characterization of Vibullius, disguising the significance of his actions", p. 31).

[30] Nevertheless, Florus' narrative on the conflicts between Caesar and Pompey shares a number of common elements with Lucan. Those similarities allow for two interpretations: (1) they are perceived as Florus' borrowings from Lucan, see e.g. Jahn 1852: XLVII f.; Westerburg 1882; Cumpfe 1884; recently e.g. Radicke 2004: 20–22 (although he considers Livy as Lucan's sole historical source, he points out that some of Florus' mistakes result from using Lucan's text: "die sachlichen Fehler des Florus, die aus der Benutzung Lucans entstanden zu sein scheinen", p. 20); Leigh 2007: 492; (2) they prove, among other evidence, that Lucan based his work mainly on *Ab*

war at all costs and the other who must yield, hesitantly, to the former's will and actions. In Appian, both leaders are hampered by the condition of their armies (*BCiv*. II 56). Pompey, however, intending to face Caesar before his reinforcements arrive, stood in battle formation, but the two of his men who were looking for the best ford were killed by a single Caesarian soldier. Interpreting that as an ominous sign, he retreated (58). In Cassius Dio, Caesar, after arriving at Apsus, led his troops into battle, but because his adversary's forces outnumbered his own, he stopped the march. Trying to avoid suspicions that he had done so out of fear and not wanting to be accused of having made the first move towards war, he started making offers of peace and refrained from further action (XLI 47, 2). Then Pompey, refusing to believe the offers of peace (γνοὺς δὲ ταῦθ' ὁ Πομπήιος 47, 3), moved his army and tried to cross the river, but the bridge collapsed and the soldiers who had crossed were killed. Discouraged, he gave up (we can see here a certain resemblance to Appian). In Florus' *Epitome* II 13, 35–42 (the leaders' actions in Epirus), Caesar is savage ("pro natura ferox", 38), trying to end the war as soon as possible, but Pompey is stalling ("nectere moras", 42), wanting to weaken him and curb his fervour. The actions of the leaders are a tactic aimed at defeating their adversary (38: "diversa erant ducum consilia" ~ 43: "Nec diutius profuit ducis [*scil.* Pompey's] salutare consilium"). In Lucan's Book V, Pompey's delay ("indulgere morae", V 733; cf. "nectere moras" in Florus) is not a plan to win the war, but a character trait. The picture is slightly different in Plutarch's *Life of Pompey* (Epirus: 65) – here it is Pompey who pushes for conflict and becomes more and more ambitious and more thirsty for glory and power, while Caesar strives for peace[31]. After the crossing, he immediately sends one "Jubius" (which is corrected to Vibullius[32]), his prisoner of war and Pompey's friend, with a peace mission (in the *Commentarii*, Vibullius is not Caesar's prisoner at that moment, but he previously has been). Pompey considers this a trick and initiates action. If we adopt Pelling's view that Plutarch used Asinius Pollio's historical work[33], we could assume that Lucan constructs his narrative simply in opposition to him or to a widely defined pro-Caesarian historiography, and did not have to reach for the *Commentarii de bello civili*. However, one should bear in mind that Caesar's portrayal is slightly different in

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urbe condita, see Baier 1874: 3–5; Postgate 1896: XIII, n. 4; Pichon 1912: 69–81 (polemic with Westerburg's article). Postgate (1917: XXIV) states in the introduction to the commentary on Book VIII: "Much of the difficulty concerning the relation of Florus' narrative to Lucan's would be removed by the assumption, to which there is no evident objection, that the *epitomator* of Livy made use of *Lucan* and that *Florus* used the *Epitome*" (original italics).

[31] See de Wet 1981: 129.

[32] E.g. Perrin 1917: 284, n. 1: "Οὐιβούλλιον after Caesar, Bell. Civ. iii. 10: Ἰούβιον".

[33] Pelling 1979: 83–91; 2011: 44–47; naturally, Plutarch also reached for other sources, especially biographical ones. According to Westall (2018: 201–203), this might have been Livy for both biographies.

his biography. He is portrayed as an active character (Epirus: Plut. *Caes*. 37–38). It is possible, though, that Plutarch reached for the same sources while writing both *Lives*, but he puts the emphasis in different places, according to the requirements and objectives of the given biography[34]. Nevertheless, there are several other premises (mentioned above) which allow us to state that Lucan reacts directly to the text of Julius Caesar.

The similarities should not obscure the differences. The distinct characteristic of Lucan's text is the extensive multiplicity of voices. Only at first glance does it seem to be unambiguous and opposed to Caesar's narration. The interpretation largely depends on what we accentuate and what we omit. In the middle of the passage an intersubjective voice of the world has been placed (469–472). It judges the opponents in a similar way – they both commit *nefas*, which they might have condemned if they had only faced each other ("damnare nefas", 471). The contrary voices of the narrator of the poem and the narrator of the *Commentarii* (introduced by the intertextual play) try to fight that outlook. Another voice is provided by internal self-references.

In the *Commentarii*, the narrator shares the wishes of the troops gathered by the river and Pompey's ambitions are to blame, but the voice of the world in Lucan provokes the question as to whether Caesar really did everything he could to stop the war. The introduction of the leaders themselves instead of the soldiers emphasises the role of the generals' personal meeting and constitutes criticism of the naive propaganda. Caesar's efforts by the Apsus are interpreted as either feigned (the offers of peace are interpreted as such by Cassius Dio) or insignificant. The soldiers' negotiations, even if inspired by one of the adversaries, do not have any real meaning as the troops do not decide about peace. Vatinius admittedly invokes Pompey's treatment of the rebels' and pirates' messengers, which implies that he should allow citizens to send delegations to their fellow citizens on the other side; Pompey, however, is not leading the war against the citizens in the strict sense of the word (a perception Caesar tries to push) and such delegations would not come to him with an offer of surrender and submission. As much as Caesar might have tried to act through Vibullius at the beginning or negotiate with Libon about sending emissaries safely, then later, if the camps were located close to each other for some time and the soldiers on both sides could talk to each other, did he not have any other way to reach out to his former son-in-law himself to talk to him in person? The whole world was hoping that it was possible. Unfortunately, the view of the world in Lucan is a double-edged sword, and it strikes Pompey in a similar way. The narrator attempts to fight that view, first in the metaphorical *ekphrasis* and then openly in the apostrophe. Thus he acts just like Caesar does as the narrator of the *Commentarii* and tries to blame the war on his opponent, to whose will the loving son-in-law must

[34] See esp. the remarks on the Roman lives by Pelling (1979 and 1980).

yield. But the doubts raised by the world's voice remain. The epic narrator does not explain what Pompey himself did in order to end the war.

Lucan's *ekphrasis* also introduces a semantically important motif of *spectaculum*. The commanders set up their camps between the rivers Apsus and Genusus (in Caesar, Appian and Cassius Dio there is just one river which separates the camps). Not only do those two rivers characterise the leaders, but they also create an arena ("tellus, quam [...] circumeunt ripis", V 462–463). Its small size is accentuated – the rivers are short, flowing through a relatively small area (466–467). The first line of the passage already features the verb *videre* (*vidit*, V 461). That land, bordered by the rivers, became the arena and was the first to see a pair of gladiators brought together by fortune: "fortuna [...] composuit", 468 f.[35] (the gladiatorial metaphor appears again at the beginning of the next book: "parque suum videre dei", VI 3[36]). The whole world becomes the audience. But instead of typical gladiatorial combat, we witness a peculiar, almost absurd scene. The audience wishes the fighters to take a look at each other and end their confrontation. They refuse. It seems obvious that opponents who are in close proximity would glance at each other, but in this strange fight where the gladiators are bound by familial ties, it may be tantamount to ending their clash. The combat will therefore be finished in another arena. The verb *videre* together with the noun *arena* closes the passage: "te nisi Niliaca propius non vidit harena" (V 475)[37]. Only on the sands of the Nile will the victor look at the one he defeated. On the one hand, the narrator suddenly becomes a member of the audience in the amphitheatre (together with the readers, those living after the civil wars) as we move from the past tense – *vidit*, *composuit*, *fuit* – to the "present" of the address to Pompey. On the other hand, he already possesses knowledge which the audience in the text does not have (but that knowledge does not mean we can trust his assessment of the situation). The motif of *spectaculum* demonstrates the helplessness of the world, including the soldiers from Caesar's text, the narrator and the audience of the poem – by the river Apsus all are merely the audience of the spectacle arranged by Fortuna.

It is worth stopping once more by the river Genusus, introduced in the *ekphrasis*. To sum up what has already been said, the Apsus (Seman) and the Genusus (Shkumbin) do surround the area of the first operations in Epirus in

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[35] The verb *componere* is often used in the context of gladiatorial combats; see *ThLL*, vol. III, s.v., col. 2112, ll. 24 ff.: "speciatim de pugnantibus i. q. opponere (proprie de gladiatoribus, hinc translate de aliis...)". Lucan V 469 is quoted in lines 31 f.

[36] For *par* as a pair of gladiators, see *ThLL*, vol. X, s.v., col. 271, ll. 32 ff.

[37] Earlier, at the end of Book II, when Pompey departs from Italy, Pharian sands are mentioned: "Phariae busto damnantur harenae" (733). Leigh has devoted an entire book to the motif of *spectaculum* in Lucan (Leigh 1997). However, he does not discuss V 461 ff., where the audience does not really enjoy the spectacle (on Lucan's amphitheatrical audience and its *voluptas*, see pp. 283–288).

a way. Listing them together gives the *ekphrasis* additional meaning, linking it to the human reality, the main rivals; at the same time it creates the arena for the spectacle. The commanders, the gladiators, are not separated by anything, which only emphasises the meaning of the passage – if the camps are located closer than in reality ("iunctis [...] castris" is a manipulation), it would be even easier for them to glance at each other. The rivers are also an element of the system of internal self-references (see below), but not everything. What is more, the introduction of the Genusus next to the Apsus probably constitutes part of the intertextual play with the propaganda of the *Commentarii*. In the surviving texts about the civil war, that river is mentioned by Caesar himself and later by Cassius Dio – in both the name appears after the battle of Dyrrachium. The similarities end here. The Greek historian writes that after his victory Pompey did not pursue Caesar as he fled to Thessaly, but retreated from the city and crossed the Genusus, believing he had finished the war (XLI 51, 1). The name is never mentioned later. The situation in the *Commentarii* is entirely different: Caesar retreats from Dyrrachium and Pompey follows him; a skirmish between the Pompeian cavalry and Caesar's rearguard takes place by the aforementioned river ("quod ripis erat inpeditis"; III 75, 4). Next, Caesar crosses the river and settles in his former camp opposite Asparagium (III 76, 1). Pompey's armies also occupy their former camp at Asparagium (III 76, 2). The opponents encamped by that city located on the river Genusus after Antony's arrival and once the armies moved away from the Apsus (III 30, 7; III 41, 1). Mentioning the Genusus may mean that while recounting the episode by the Apsus Lucan simultaneously reminds us about the other location, where the camps were close to each other for a second time and were not even separated by the river[38]. There Caesar stood for battle, which Pompey did not accept:

> Caesar postquam Pompeium ad Asparagium esse cognovit, [...] tertio die ad Pompeium pervenit iuxtaque eum castra posuit et postridie eductis omnibus copiis acie instructa decernendi potestatem Pompeio fecit. ubi illum suis locis se tenere animum advertit, reducto in castra exercitu aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit.
> (III 41, 1–2)

[38] To some extent Lucan also combines the two episodes in order to contrast the leaders more clearly, omitting the unnecessary manoeuvres of the armies. Whereas Caesar's attempt at a nocturnal crossing to Brundisium took place when the camps were set up by the Apsus, the farewell with Cornelia (probably Lucan's invention) should have happened by Asparagium on the river Genusus – because Antony had already joined Caesar's armies, which the following line seems to indicate: "undique conlatis in robur Caesaris armis/ summa videns...", V 722–723). However, the first lines of the next book suggest a change of location ("Postquam castra duces pugnae iam mente propinquis/ inposuere iugis", VI l–2); Caesar tries to lure Pompey out of the camp in order to fight a battle – so we are near Asparagium, but this name it is not mentioned. Caesar writes that he left the camp once (III 41, 1), in Lucan – three times (VI 8–9), which is of course an exaggeration. Next the armies move towards Dyrrachium.

Caesar's actions differ from what he had been doing in the past; he is no longer interested in making peace, but now he has the entire army. In his message to his rival, entrusted to Vibullius, Caesar portrayed himself and Pompey as equals, assuming that it was the right time to make peace – it will not be possible once either of them gains an advantage ("pares ambo viderentur, si vero alteri paulum modo tribuisset fortuna, non esse usurum condicionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur", III 10, 7). To prove that equality, he enumerates only the defeats they both have suffered. At the same time he omits an important detail – since Antony's arrival they have not been equal in Epirus in terms of the number of soldiers, and Pompey has a significant advantage here. Caesar ends chapter 13 with a comment that his rival has put his entire army in the camp by the Apsus, including auxiliaries (III 13, 6). This mention may suggest that he did so with battle in mind. However, in the later narrative, even though he rejects a peace offer, he does not attack first (he does so only in Appian). Caesar himself, as soon as he has all the legions under his command, immediately tries to provoke a fight. In the context of the intertextual play with the *Commentarii*, that combination of two different episodes provides a broader picture and casts a shadow over Caesar's peace efforts on the Apsus; it is also part of the deconstruction of the propaganda spread by the winner of the battle of Pharsalus. He is at once presented as an aggressor.

The internal self-references, which evoke several dozen lines from the introduction to the narrative on the war in I 109–157, harmonise with the world's voice. In the apostrophe V 472–475, the narrator uses Julia, her death in childbirth, and the death of her children and of Pompey as an accusation towards Caesar, who, in spite of the bonds he had with his opponent, cannot stop fighting: "post pignora tanta,/ sanguinis infausti subolem mortemque nepotum" (V 473–474). Those words, however, refer us to the lines on her death (also in the form of the apostrophe – addressed to her directly): "nam pignora iuncti/ sanguinis et diro ferales omine taedas/ abstulit ad manes [...] Iulia" (I 111–113). After Crassus' death, only Julia was a barrier preventing the conflict. After her death in childbirth (followed shortly by the baby's death), nothing could stop the son-in-law and the father-in-law from turning on each other (109–120). Pompey, similarly to Caesar, is guided there by *furor* (115) and they both wish to fight. Next, the generals are compared (120–157; the famous *synkrisis* of the main actors): the transformation of the images from Book I is naturally, as we have already mentioned, the juxtaposition of the two very different rivers. This evocation does not seem odd now in Book V. On the Apsus, the commanders stand next to each other for the second time in the poem, this time physically. The first time in the text they did so figuratively in the comparison.

Moreover, the words from Book V constituting the transition from the description of place to the human world – "hoc fortuna loco tantae duo nomina famae/ conposuit" (468–469) – also remind us of the comparison of the rivals

from Book I. There the son-in-law and the father-in-law "face" each other in the poem, but are not equal: "nec coiere pares" (I 129; cf. VI 3, quoted above). In the quoted phrase one can notice the gladiatorial metaphor, as the rivals are depicted by the narrator as mismatched gladiators[39] (therefore the *spectaculum* and gladiatorial combat in Book V is supplemented by the evocation of the motif in Book I). The differences between the adversaries are determined in Book I with the words *fama* and *nomen*, key for the juxtaposition. Pompey is a man hungry for fame, *famae petitor* (131), but at the same time a shadow of his own self and of what is conveyed by his nickname, "magni nominis umbra"[40]. The part devoted to the victor begins with the words: "sed non in Caesare tantum/ nomen erat nec fama ducis" (143–144). Not only did he enjoy fame as a general, he also possessed valour which did not allow him to stay in one place, and it was disgraceful to him to conquer without war: "sed nescia virtus/ stare loco, solusque pudor non vincere bello" (144–145). The evocation of the *synkrisis*, presenting the victor of Pharsalus as a destructive force that only seeks war and will stop at nothing, is part of the discussion with Caesar's propaganda and supports the narrator's voice. It is different when it comes to Pompey. He is also a gladiator. He fears that someone could overshadow his victories and position, and he cannot stand even the one to be equal to him, whereas Caesar is only afraid of someone more powerful than himself, a situation which has been expressed by a well-known maxim: "nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem/ Pompeiusve parem. quis iustius induit arma/ scire nefas" (I 125–126)[41]. The image evoked of Pompey from Book I of the poem is very similar to the one emerging from the ending of chapter 18 of Book III in Caesar's *Commentarii* – on account of his ambition, Pompey does not want to be perceived as equal to anyone – as this assumption was the foundation of Caesar's argumentation (III 10, 7; see above). It is worth pointing out that this characterisation of Pompey is also outlined at the beginning of the *Commentarii*[42], where even the second part of Lucan's epigram appears:

> Ipse Pompeius, ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus, et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat, totum se ab eius amicitia averterat et cum communibus inimicis in gratiam redierat [...]. rem ad arma deduci studebat (I 4, 4–5).

The evocation of the *synkrisis* also affects the poem's narrator. On the one hand, Lucan responds to the propaganda of the *Commentarii* with his own, juxtaposing the images of Pompey and Caesar in chapter III 18–19 and those drawn

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[39] Feeney 1986: 239.

[40] For Pompey's portrayal and the play on words in the phrase, see Feeney 1986.

[41] Pichon (1912: 70) assumed that Lucan found the epigram from I 125–126 in Livy. Lintott (1971: 494) presents arguments against this view. In Seneca both parts functioned separately (*Cons. ad Marc*. 14, 3 on Pompey and *Ep*. 94, 65 on Caesar).

[42] Cf. Peer 2015: 130.

by his narrator in V 461–475; on the other, he criticises and reveals the weakness of the propaganda from both sides. Lucan's entire epigram I 125–126 is repeated by Florus. After mentioning the deaths of Crassus and Julia, he writes: "Iam Pompeio suspectae Caesaris opes et Caesari Pompeiana dignitas gravis. nec ille ferebat parem, nec hic superiorem. pro nefas! sic de principatu laborabant, tamquam duos tanti imperii fortuna non caperet" (II 13, 8). The similarity of those words to Lucan's lines I 120–127 (partly quoted above) is striking. However, Florus does not change his judgement when recounting the fights near Dyrrachium. The poem's narrator himself is critical of both rivals at the beginning of the poem, then gets increasingly involved and picks a side. The intertextual references do not allow us to forget that fact, recalling his earlier portrayal of Pompey[43], consistent with the world's voice, and, what is more interesting, with the intertext of Caesar himself. Thus not only does Lucan fight the narrator of the *Commentarii* with his text, but the *Commentarii* are also used to expose the propaganda of the poem's narrator[44].

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[43] This phenomenon is discussed by Bartsch 1997: 75–93. See also Masters 1994 (p. 163: "we are invited to deconstruct his propaganda *qua* propaganda").

[44] Naturally, we encounter an unsolved narratological problem here. It is debatable to which narrative instance of the text external (intertextual) references should be attributed, and the question is even more interesting when it comes to the internal self-references. Should they be attributed to the narrator himself, to the implied author (if we acknowledge his existence), or the author in general? There are several options. If those self-references belong to the narrator, then he is fighting himself like Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, but if they do not – then the text itself is fighting its own narrator... These considerations, however, go well beyond the subject of this article.

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