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## ΘΥΜΟΣ IN HOMER: PHILOLOGICAL, ORAL-POETIC, AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES

### Abstract

Thomas Jahn's deft deployment of Parry's oral-formulaic theory has shown that in a large number of occurrences, when used adverbially (with a preposition, in the instrumental dative, or in some other analogous use of an oblique case, e.g. ἐν(ι) θυμῶ, κατὰ θυμόν, θυμῶ, etc.), the usage of the words denoting the so-called "psychic organs" can be less a matter of semantic specificity than of metrical convenience, so that these terms exhibit substantial degrees of overlap and redundancy. Thus we need to treat the "psychic organs" as a family (of which θυμός is by far the most representative member) rather than as wholly independent variables. But careful philology can supplement this picture by demonstrating that even in non-formulaic and more marked contexts (e.g. when personified as agents or interlocutors) the relevant terms may be interchangeable in function. Once that has been established, approaches drawn from the cognitive sciences can help us pin down the ways in which the "psychic organs" can, *via* metonymy and metaphor, capture aspects of mental

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functioning in Homer without ever detracting from the agency of the person as a whole.

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For an older tradition of scholarship, the existence in the Homeric poems of a plurality of “psychic organs” θυμός, φρένες, κραδίη, ἦτορ, κῆρ, and more, illustrated the primitiveness of Homeric concepts of self and agency. For Bruno Snell, famously, the explanation of mental process in terms of the promptings of θυμός, other organs, and the gods makes Homeric man “a battleground of arbitrary forces and uncanny powers”; “Homeric man has not yet awakened to the fact that he possesses in his own soul the source of his powers.”<sup>2</sup> This is an approach that involves taking the plurality of terms as a plurality of agents that detracts from the agency of the person. Arthur Adkins summarizes this view succinctly when he endorses the claim that “Homeric Man ... has a psychology and a physiology in which the parts are more evident than the whole.”<sup>3</sup>

Such views are vulnerable to criticism on a variety of fronts. The dominant approach has been to attack them as flawed intellectual history, arguing that they make untenable assumptions (a) about the primitiveness of Homeric conceptions of agency, (b) about the explanatory power of Cartesian, Kantian, and Hegelian conceptions, and (c) about the teleological nature of the historical processes that link them. This is the view taken by scholars such as Arbogast Schmitt, Bernard Williams, and Christopher Gill.<sup>4</sup>

But the most significant contribution so far to the refutation of Snell’s approach is the 1987 monograph by Thomas

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<sup>2</sup> SNELL 1953, 19–22 (quotations pp. 21–22).

<sup>3</sup> ADKINS 1970, 26.

<sup>4</sup> SCHMITT 1990; WILLIAMS 1993; GILL 1996.

Jahn.<sup>5</sup> Unlike Snell and others, Jahn does not start from the assumption that a plurality of terms presupposes a plurality of functions, but instead explores the functional similarity of the so-called “psychic organs” (p. 245). He is not the first to have taken a functionalist approach, but his method is systematic where earlier accounts were not. Taking every single instance of each of the relevant terms into account, Jahn shows (first) that each of the “psychic organs” is implicated in all three main areas of psychological functioning (reason, emotion, volition) and (second) that, in respect of a large number of more specific functions (e.g. deliberating, desiring, being afraid, being angry, etc.), there is no function that is not represented by more than one (and normally by several) of the relevant terms (see his table, pp. 186–192). Having shown *that* these terms, in so far as they denote psychological functions, are functionally equivalent, Jahn then explains *why* they are so (pp. 247ff.). No locution in which these terms appear in the nominative case as subject of a verb is metrically identical to any of the others; in the oblique cases, too, metrical identity is for the most part avoided – there are a few exceptions, but oblique-case formulas are very numerous, and the general pattern remains impressive. The so-called “psychic organs”, in so far as they are used to denote psychological functioning, form a flexible system of alternatives which embodies Parry’s principles of extension and economy. This is a system which, with only a few exceptions, does not generate metrically identical ways of expressing the same basic idea.

It is important to recognize what Jahn does and does not claim. He regards the relevant terms as interchangeable, but only in so far as they are used in connexion with psychological functions. As physical entities (in the chest) they are not

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<sup>5</sup> JAHN 1987. For earlier functionalist approaches, cf. CLAUS 1981, 25, 45–46 (cf. 16–21, 27–28, 37, 39–41, 47 on adverbial uses); BREMMER 1983, 53–63. On Jahn’s findings, see VAN DER MIJJE 1991, 2011; SCHMITT 1990, 175; PELLICCIA 1995, 99–103; CLARKE 1999, 63–66.

interchangeable (pp. 17–18, 296–297). This makes a considerable difference when it comes to θυμός – though everything that the θυμός can do as a psychological entity is paralleled in the case of at least one of the other “organs”, as a physical entity – e.g. in its regular conceptualization as a kind of breath – θυμός can do things (such as leave the body) that the other “psychic organs”, rooted as they are as physical organs in the chest, cannot.<sup>6</sup> This helps explain why to take away a person’s θυμός means to kill that person, while a god’s removal of a person’s φρένες means only that the person’s judgement was impaired.<sup>7</sup>

Secondly, though Jahn shows with copious examples that oblique-case adverbial formulas such as ἐνὶ θυμῷ, ἐνὶ φρεσὶ, κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμύμονα, κατὰ φρένα, κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν, etc.) in effect add nothing to the verbs that they modify, he is also at pains to show that this is not true in every case (even of adverbial uses). There are what he calls *prāgnant* cases (pp. 213–246), in which the reference to internal psychological functioning is not redundant, but pointed. For example, forms of the verb χαίρειν are found with θυμός, φρήν, κῆρ, ἦτορ, and with none of these.<sup>8</sup> Normally, locutions such as χαῖρε δὲ θυμῷ (x7) and χαίρων ἐνὶ θυμῷ (x2) simply specify (pleonastically) that the internal psychological event of rejoicing is an internal psychological event (see JAHN 1987, 225).

<sup>6</sup> θυμός as breath: dying warriors breathe out their θυμός (*Il.* 4. 522–524, 13. 653–654); the θυμός of the dying horse, Pegasus, is breathed out and flies off (*Il.* 16. 468–469; breathed out: cf. *Od.* 5. 468; flies off: cf. *Od.* 10. 163, 19. 454); sacrificial animals lie gasping on the ground, short of θυμός (*Il.* 3. 293–294; cf. *Il.* 8. 368). θυμός leaves or is lost in death (x23 *Il.*, x6 *Od.*); killer (or cause of death) removes one’s θυμός (x25 *Il.*, x9 *Od.*). θυμός and ψυχή leave body together, in death (*Il.* 11. 334), in swoon (*Il.* 5. 696–698). Contrast *Il.* 22. 466–475, *Od.* 24. 345–350: ψυχή breathed out/departs in swoon, θυμός breathed back in (for “gathering one’s θυμός” (etc.) as getting one’s breath back, cf. *Il.* 21. 417, *Od.* 5. 458).

<sup>7</sup> *Il.* 6. 234, 9. 377, 17. 470, 18. 311, 19. 317.

<sup>8</sup> χαίρειν found with θυμός (x7 *Il.*, x7 *Od.*), φρήν (x2 *Il.*), κῆρ (x2 *Od.*), ἦτορ (*Il.* 23. 647), but more frequently (x87) with none. Cf. *ιαίνω* (with θυμός, φρήν, κραδίη, κῆρ, ἦτορ, and none); *γηθέω* (with θυμός, φρήν, κῆρ, ἦτορ, and none).

But still the adverbial phrase can be meaningful, as when Odysseus, after killing the Suitors, tells Eurycleia ἐν θυμῷ, γοηῦ, χαίρει καὶ ἴσχεο μηδ' ὀλόλυζε (*Od.* 22. 411): here ἐν θυμῷ is opposed to an alternative mode of χαίρειν, i.e. ὀλόλυζειν, and identifies silent rejoicing as an inner psychological experience.<sup>9</sup> This sense is clearest when the verb, as here, denotes outward (audible, visible, etc.) behaviour (cf. *Od.* 20. 301, μείδησε δὲ θυμῷ), but even when used with verbs that actually denote inner psychological experience the relevant locutions can have the same force, specifying that these are indeed internal processes (of a certain intensity and phenomenological character). But the point is that this “pregnant” or meaningful function can be discharged by any of the “psychic organs” – locutions using (e.g.) φρήν/φρένες (in both nominative and oblique cases) can be used to specify interiority in the same, non-redundant way.<sup>10</sup> Functionally, again, these terms constitute a single system. In meaningful (*prägnant*) senses, the relevant locutions are, as Jahn puts it, *funktionsgleich*; in the other cases they are *funktionslos* – i.e. “he deliberated in his θυμός” not only means the same as “he deliberated in his φρένες”, but both of these just mean “he deliberated”. But again, this does not mean that θυμός and φρένες have, in themselves, the same meaning, any more than πόδας ὠκύς and δῖος mean the same thing, even though πόδας ὠκύς Ἀχιλλεύς and δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς (as noun-epithet formulas) carry the same semantic value as the simple Ἀχιλλεύς.

In Jahn’s thesis, oral-formulaic theory plays a big part, but not the only part. We also need the inductive method that means that we do not classify and generalize until we have

<sup>9</sup> On such *prägnant* (i.e. meaning-laden) cases, see JAHN 1987, 213–246.

<sup>10</sup> For φρήν with reference to undetectable inner experiences, see e.g. *Od.* 4. 675–676 (οὐδ’ ἄρα Πηνελόπεια πολὺν χρόνον ἦεν ἄπυστος | μῦθων, οὐς μνηστήρες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βυσοσόδομευον); 4. 777 (ἀλλ’ ἄγε σιγῇ τοῖον ἀναστάντες τελέωμεν | μῦθον, ὃ δὴ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἦραρον ἡμῖν); 17. 65–66 (ἄμφι δὲ μιν μνηστήρες ἀγήνορες ἠγερέθοντο | ἔσθλ’ ἀγορεύοντες, κακὰ δὲ φρεσὶ βυσοσόδομευον); 17. 238 (ἀλλ’ ἐπετόλμησε, φρεσὶ δ’ ἔσχετο).

collected all the relevant instances; and – especially in distinguishing the meaningful cases – we need the close attention to context that is characteristic of good philology.<sup>11</sup> But there are also some details that remain to be worked out. Though he cites all instances of the relevant terms, Jahn does not (as van der Mije and Pelliccia point out), demonstrate his thesis as fully for the nominative-case locutions as he does for the oblique-case examples. But even if his findings were true only for those cases (the vast majority), he would still have proved his point.<sup>12</sup> We might, perhaps, want to think further about how narrowly we should distinguish one function from another. Jahn distinguishes at two levels: between reason, emotion, and volition; and between sub-categories such as deliberation, joy, anger, and fear. But we might want to look more closely at the behaviour of specific locutions within the latter set of categories, to see whether some cluster more with one term than with another. And we might also want to be open to the idea that even preponderance in the association of a particular function or set of functions with one “organ” rather than another might create specific associations and expectations in the minds of audiences.<sup>13</sup> But this would merely qualify Jahn’s thesis. As psychological entities, the various so-called organs at the least overlap in their functions and certainly do not exist to isolate distinct capacities or motivations. One occasionally encounters outright rejection of Jahn’s

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<sup>11</sup> JAHN 1987, 231, 296, 298.

<sup>12</sup> In fact, PELLICCIA (1995, 99–103) is able to demonstrate that the nominative system also shows a “tendency to semantic degradation”, at least “in peripheral contexts” (p. 103).

<sup>13</sup> VAN DER MIJE 2011, using the example of *θυμός* and *φρήν* as object of the verb *πειθεῖν* (and compounds) as a case-study, pursues the possibility that in particular combinations each term may take on different connotations (of “rational persuasion” in the case of *φρήν* and of “emotional persuasion” in that of *θυμός*). It is in itself likely that such effects should occur; but there is a suspicion of subjectivity in the nuances that van der Mije detects. One might contrast this study with my discussion of deliberation below, in which the kinds of distinction that van der Mije argues for in the case of persuasion do not seem to be operative.

findings,<sup>14</sup> but this is dismissal, not refutation. There is no attempt to provide the substantive arguments and evidence that would be needed to disprove a case as detailed and careful as Jahn's is. The most searching and critical review of Jahn's book (by Sebastiaan van der Mije) in fact accepts its basic premises.<sup>15</sup>

Jahn's dissertation was written before the cognitive turn had made much impact on Classics. But his findings are enhanced if we adopt a cognitive approach. First, the use of (real or putative) parts of the body to think and talk about mental functioning is a basic mechanism of human cognition. It reflects (a) the embodied nature of cognition itself; (b) the experiential (phenomenological) immediacy of the body and its experiences in the conceptualization of the mind; and (c) the role of metonymy or synecdoche in using parts of the body and bodily movements as labels for the psychological activities of the whole person.<sup>16</sup> But as well as metonymy, the use of these physical entities involves metaphor, from the basic ontological metaphors that turn activities (such as thinking, feeling, and wanting) into objects or agents, to the more specific varieties of these in which we see ourselves as bounded containers for such objects or agents or the internal objects become containers for our thoughts and feelings. In deploying these mechanisms of thought, human beings in all cultures move from the concrete – accessed by the senses and experienced in the course of our interaction, as embodied human beings, with our physical and social environments – to the abstract.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> E.g. JEREMIAH 2012, 11–15; SEAFORD 2017, 12. Occasionally, too, discussions of relevant topics (e.g. RUSSO 2012) simply take no account of Jahn's work.

<sup>15</sup> VAN DER MIJE 1991.

<sup>16</sup> See further CAIRNS 2013, 2014.

<sup>17</sup> See esp. LAKOFF AND JOHNSON 1980. For conceptual metaphor in Homer, see now ZANKER 2019.

One very important way in which this approach intersects with Jahn's concerns the issue of real and metaphorical agency. Jahn's findings show that to say that a person thinks, feels, and desires with the *θυμός* (etc.) is simply to say that thinking, feeling, and desiring are internal psychological events. The thoughts, feelings, and desires – and the reasons that motivate them – are those of the person, not of the so-called psychic organ. Jahn's findings in this regard suggest, and he himself assumes, that functional identity also pertains between cases in which an agent (e.g.) thinks or desires with, in, or in respect of his *θυμός* and cases in which the *θυμός* itself is the subject. I think this is incontrovertible: but Jahn's analysis does not quite prove it, first because, as he notes, the adverbial and the nominative uses of the relevant terms constitute different systems, so that we cannot extrapolate from one to the other in purely oral-poetic terms, and second because far from all cases in which the "organ" is the subject of a verb are formulaic.

But two simple facts about conceptual metaphors for cognitive-affective processes will show that Jahn's intuitions are right. First, when conceptual metaphor maps from one domain to another, the mapping is not total: time may be money, but though one can spend it, save it, or borrow it, one cannot bequeath it to one's children; I can give you an idea, but this does not mean that you now have it and I no longer do. In accordance with what Lakoff and Johnson call the "invariance principle", important structural features of the target domain must remain unaffected by the mapping process. The motivation of conceptual metaphors for things like deliberation and emotion is to explain aspects of our behaviour as agents. And so replacing our agency with that of a metaphorical agent would violate the invariance principle. Beyond that, agency detection is a fundamental aspect of the human cognitive tool-kit: we understand from a very early age that some of the entities we encounter out there in the world have minds and some do not; we have robust and deeply engrained

mechanisms for distinguishing between agents and objects.<sup>18</sup> To be sure, our agent-detection capacities are hyper-active, and we attribute agency metaphorically to all kinds of things that do not really have it.<sup>19</sup> This is a sign that our minds have evolved in particular to face the challenges of our social environments. But still real agency is prior to metaphorical agency. There can be no concept of anthropomorphic gods or of agent-like aspects of the personality without a robust conception of personal agency.

In order to illustrate the combination of this approach with Jahn's, I concentrate on one single area, deliberation, and offer one worked example, which will also show how Jahn's oralist theory and conceptual metaphor theory together can be combined with traditional close reading to do something that Jahn in fact never does – to examine a single substantial passage in detail.

There are two Homeric verbs that mean “to deliberate”: μερμηρίζω and ὀρμαίνω.<sup>20</sup> The former occurs 41 times in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, in 13 verb-forms occurring at four different points in the hexameter line, though line-end preponderates (23 cases). In 38 cases the human agent is subject. In 22 of these there is no pleonastic adverbial phrase referring to a “psychic organ”. In the remaining 16 the adverbial phrase varies between θυμός and φρήν/φρένες.<sup>21</sup> In three cases, the “psychic organ” is subject: θυμός twice and ἦτορ once, in each case with a further adverbial phrase. With ὀρμαίνω, we also

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<sup>18</sup> On humans' “innate primary intersubjectivity”, see TREVARTHEN 1979, 1998; DISSAYANAKE 2000 *passim*; DECETY AND MELTZOFF 2011; GALLAGHER 2020. On our capacity for attributing mental states to others, see the different approaches of (e.g.) BARON-COHEN 1995, 1999; GÄRDENFORS 2003, 83–109; NICHOLS AND STICH 2003; GALLAGHER 2020. For the classic demonstration of the way we intuitively distinguish agents and objects, see HEIDER AND SIMMEL 1944.

<sup>19</sup> BOYER 2001.

<sup>20</sup> See JAHN 1987, 272–283.

<sup>21</sup> κατὰ φρένα x1; κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν x6; φρεσὶ x3; ἐνὶ φρεσὶ x3; (ἐμὸν) κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμύμονα x2; μετὰ φρεσὶ x1.

have 13 verb forms at five points in the line – 29 cases in total. In 26 of these, the human agent is subject, and in 11 of these there is no pleonastic adverbial phrase referring to a “psychic organ”. In the remaining 15 cases the adverbial phrase varies between θυμός and φρήν/φρένες.<sup>22</sup> In three cases, the “psychic organ” (κῆρ in each case) is subject, once with a further adverbial phrase, twice without. And so the standard Homeric way to refer to deliberation is to use the simple verbs μερμηρίζω and ὀρμαίνω, with the person as subject. Deliberation is something a human agent does; the presumption must be that when the θυμός, the ἦτορ, or the κῆρ does it, these metaphorical agents represent ways of thinking and talking about human agency.

There are, of course, other ways of talking about deliberation, but in these too the pattern is the same – the θυμός can be divided or the person him- or herself can be divided.<sup>23</sup> However it is expressed, deliberation typically involves either two alternatives or means-end reasoning. These are typically expressed propositionally, as indirect questions (whether to do x or y; how to do z). Sometimes there is also a conclusion in the form of a decision to do what “seemed better”, which is equally propositional. And so the content of deliberation is at least implicitly discursive – it lends itself to formulation in terms of speech.<sup>24</sup> Accordingly, deliberation can be expressed not by indirect deliberative questions, but by direct speech.<sup>25</sup> Whether this is actual speech or speech representing thought, it is clear that the thought in question is the agent’s own.

The same is true in that subset of cases in which the agent’s deliberation is followed by direct speech described in the speech-introduction formula as an address to the θυμός. These speeches are attributed, in two different formulas, to humans

<sup>22</sup> κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν x8; ἀνὰ θυμὸν x3; φρεσὶν x2 (or 3); ἐνὶ φρεσὶν x1; κατὰ φρένα x1; κατὰ θυμὸν x1 (possibly).

<sup>23</sup> Person divided: *Il.* 14. 20: Nestor δαΐζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν διχθάρια. θυμός divided: *Il.* 9. 8, 15. 629: ἔδαΐζετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν.

<sup>24</sup> See PELLICCIA 1995, *passim*.

<sup>25</sup> See e.g. *Od.* 6. 117–127.

and to gods.<sup>26</sup> As Pelliccia shows, these are all speeches which either have no addressee or audience or have no audience and an addressee who is not meant to hear, and so the θυμός is just a sounding-board for the agent's thoughts, expressed as direct speech; the two cases in *Odyssey* 5 in which the supposed address to the θυμός is recapitulated in a regular deliberation formula (with the agent as subject) makes this especially clear.<sup>27</sup>

In a smaller sub-set of these speeches, the speech introduced by the narrator as an address to the θυμός contains the line ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;<sup>28</sup> But the question is never answered; it serves only as the conclusion of the ruminations that were introduced by the narrator as an address to the θυμός. But that is the narrator's perspective: these speeches are not actually addressed to the θυμός by their speakers: in fact they all begin ὦ μοι ἐγώ(ν). Just as the θυμός is not actually addressed, so no actual speech is attributed to it: the θυμός simply performs two conventional functions, first as sounding board for the speaker's deliberations, then as source of the rejected alternative.<sup>29</sup> The metaphor of the θυμός as a partner in dialogue does not really endow it with agency, and the mapping from person to personification respects the limitation that internal psychological experience is always *some agent's* internal psychological experience. In the longest of these passages, Hector's monologue in *Il.* 22. 98–130, the apparent "dialogue" with the θυμός clearly represents Hector's emotional turmoil as he reflects on his situation: he addresses himself; blames himself

<sup>26</sup> (a) humans, ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὄν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν (x7 *Il.*, x4 *Od.*); (b) gods, with κινήσας δὲ κάθη προτὶ ὄν μυθήσατο θυμόν (2 x each poem). On these, see PELLICCIA 1995, 121–123, 136–146, 200–203, 212–213, and *passim*; cf. GILL 1996, 58, 187. Contrast SULLIVAN 1995, 58, 69, for whom these addresses "emphasize the distinctness of person and *thumos*".

<sup>27</sup> εἶος ὁ ταῦθ' ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, *Od.* 5. 365 (picking up the address to the θυμός at 355) and 424 (picking up the address to the θυμός at 407).

<sup>28</sup> *Il.* 11. 407, 17. 97, 21. 562, 22. 122.

<sup>29</sup> See PELLICCIA 1995, 203–211, 267. On the "self-distancing" that this represents, cf. GILL 1996, 187–188.

for his previous decisions (νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ὄλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίησιν ἐμῆσιν, 104); weighs his options (105–121); and comes eventually (122–130) to a decision that, given his past mistakes and his present circumstances, he regards as “better” for him (βέλτερον αὐτ' ἔριδι ξυνελαυνέμεν ὅτι τάχιστα, 129). The involvement of the θυμός in no way detracts from his own sense of agency and responsibility, and it should not detract from our sense of him as a responsible human agent either.

I conclude with a highly individual passage of *Odyssey* 20 that will illustrate all the points I have made so far. At the beginning of that Book, Odysseus is lying sleepless in the antechamber of his own house, plotting harm for the Suitors in his θυμός (μνηστῆρσι κακὰ φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ, 5): in line 5 the reference to the θυμός merely indicates, redundantly, that plotting is an internal mental process. Then the θυμός in Odysseus' chest is aroused by laughter of his unfaithful female servants (τοῦ δ' ὠρίετο θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι, 9): θυμός is the subject of the verb ὠρίετο, but this means only that this is an internal, psychological form of arousal (as opposed to, e.g., arousing another person from their slumbers). This demonstrates, however, that one of the functions of these metaphors is to capture something of the phenomenology of subjective psychological experience. There is a process of planning and an experience of anger here: both of these have an intentional (“cognitive”) and a phenomenal (“affective”) aspect in a way that is typical of Homeric psychology.<sup>30</sup>

Internal, silent, but still emotionally charged deliberation continues, as Odysseus ponders (πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, 10) whether to kill the women on the spot or let them sleep with the Suitors one last time (10–13). This is the point at which “the heart within him barks” (κραδίη δὲ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει, 13). We shall come back to these lines presently. But first let us notice the unity that underpins the

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<sup>30</sup> See CAIRNS 2019.

shifts in the whole passage between Odysseus and his “psychic organs”. The reflections of Odysseus in 5 and 9–13 involve the θυμός in its regular adverbial function, amplifying, more or less tautologously, the interiority of mental events. The θυμός is then itself aroused in 9, before this is represented as the indignation of the κραδίη in 13–21. These are stages of a single mental process. Just as there is no functional difference between θυμός in 9 and κραδίη in 13–21, so the address to the κραδίη in 18–21 is immediately summarized as a rebuke to the ἦτορ in 22. The heart, once again called κραδίη, obeys in the next line, but Odysseus himself tosses and turns, deliberating how to obtain his revenge (28–30).<sup>31</sup> But after Athena appears in the guise of a mortal woman and reminds him of how close to his goals he is (30–35), the very same process of deliberation is attributed to the θυμός in 37–40,<sup>32</sup> before deliberation becomes, once again, an act of Odysseus himself in 41–43.<sup>33</sup> Throughout, the reflections and motivations that this passage represents, whether attributed to Odysseus, his θυμός, his κραδίη, or his ἦτορ, are those of Odysseus himself.

To return to the barking heart: we have been focusing on Homeric occurrences of conceptual metaphor. It is a feature of that mode of thought that the use of metaphor need not be deliberate or conscious. Nor does a person even need to know what metaphor is in order to use metaphors of this type. But this passage illustrates two important points: that there is a continuity between the background conceptual metaphors of everyday life and the developed metaphors of poets and other literary artists,<sup>34</sup> and that Homer does indeed have a concept

<sup>31</sup> ὡς ἄρ' ὅ γ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐλίσσετο μερμηρίζων, | ὅπως δὴ μνηστήρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσει, | μῦνος ἐὼν πολέσι.

<sup>32</sup> ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, θεά, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες· | ἀλλὰ τί μοι τόδε θυμός ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει, | ὅπως δὴ μνηστήρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσω, | μῦνος ἐὼν· οἱ δ' αἰὲν ἀολλέες ἔνδον ἔασι.

<sup>33</sup> πρὸς δ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε μείζον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζω· | εἶ περ γὰρ κτείναίμι Διὸς τε σέθεν τε ἔκητι, | πῆ κεν ὑπεκπροφύγοιμ; τὰ σε φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.

<sup>34</sup> See LAKOFF AND TURNER 1989.

of metaphor. We can say this with confidence, because, in this passage, the understanding that the barking of the heart is a mapping from one domain (animal behaviour) to another (psychological experience) is made crystal-clear by the simile that follows – the heart barks *like a female dog* defending her pups (14–16).<sup>35</sup>

At the same time, these are clearly experiences of Odysseus as agent, and the thoughts are his thoughts: the heart barks, but Odysseus is the one who resents the women’s offences (ὥς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιόμενου κακὰ ἔργα, 16). Then, however, in a (unique) variation on the speech-introduction formula in which a character is said to address his θυμός, Odysseus beats his breast and addresses his heart (στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ, 17). In an even more striking variation, the “psychic organ” is then – here and here alone – actually addressed and spoken to, using second-person verbs (18–21):

“τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτλης,  
ἤματι τῷ, ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἦσθιε Κύκλωψ  
ἰφθίμους ἐτάρους· σὺ δ’ ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μῆτις  
ἐξάγαγ’ ἐξ ἄντροιο οἴομενον θανέεσθαι.”

This takes personification of the heart further than personification of the θυμός is ever taken. But still, though the heart is addressed, it does not itself speak. But it does seem to listen: after Odysseus has “restrained the dear heart [ἦτορ] in his chest” (22), the κραδίη obeys and endures (τῷ δὲ μάλ’ ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη

<sup>35</sup> See LEIDL 2003, 38 (with reference to Porphyry, *Homeric Questions* 6). A conscious and knowing approach to the use of such imagery is also suggested by the pun, κύντερον (“more dog-like”, i.e. worse), in 18. We see the same phenomenon at *Od.* 19, 204–207, where Penelope’s skin or cheeks (in a common metaphor for grief, love, etc.) “melt” (τήκετο, 204, 208) in a way that is compared to melting snow on a mountain (205–207). In this case, the metaphor is a familiar, conventional one, while in the case of the barking heart it is a novel one (albeit based in conventional metonymies and personifications); in both cases, the amplification by means of a simile indicates deliberate, artistic use of metaphorical concepts that in other contexts might be used in a purely conventional way.

μένε τετληῖα | νωλεμέως, 23–24). There appear to be two interlocutors, even if one of them merely listens and obeys. But the lines in which Odysseus reminds the κραδίη of “its” past (18–21) show that this is so only by means of a developed poetic metaphor. This is clear not only because the experiences of the heart are transparently those of Odysseus himself, and not only because the personified μῆτις in line 20 is itself also, like the heart, clearly an avatar of Odysseus (a reference to the way in which he outwitted the Cyclops by calling himself Outis and the pun by which this becomes μῆτις/Mêtis at 9. 410). Apart from those indications, the persistence of Odysseus as operative agent, despite the personification of κραδίη and μῆτις, is also clearly demonstrated by the masculine participle, οἴόμενον, in 21, which betrays the fact that all this is Odysseus’ way of addressing himself. The participle agrees in sense with σε, i.e. the heart, in 20: “you”, the heart, endured, and μῆτις led “you” out of the cave, but the thought of imminent death is attributed to the only agent on the scene who is capable both of entertaining that thought and of being qualified by οἴόμενον, i.e. Odysseus himself.<sup>36</sup>

The personification of the barking heart in this passage is singular and striking. It dramatizes the phenomenology of Odysseus’ experience and conveys it all the more vividly and effectively to the audience. But though these metaphors of self-division contribute to this vivid dramatization of the process of deliberation and impulse control, they also leave Odysseus, the real agent, in control throughout: these are ways of talking about Odysseus’ agency. In that, the passage bears out all that I have argued above about the functions of the θυμός. None

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. HALLIWELL 1990, 40 n. 9; PELLICCIA 1995, 223 n. 203. The truth is already apparent to Eustathius, some 800 years earlier, who observes (2. 224 Stallbaum) that Odysseus’ address to his heart involves synecdoche and so is tantamount to a form of self-address (τὸ δὲ, τέπλαθι κραδίη, ἀπὸ μέρους ἀντὶ τοῦ, σὺ, ὦ Ὀδυσσεῦ), correctly adducing the gender of the participle, οἴόμενον, as conclusive proof of the contention that the κραδίη is a transparent figure for an aspect of Odysseus’ personality (οἴόμενον θανέεσθαι, σὲ δηλονότι τὸν Ὀδυσσεά).

of these “psychic organs” detracts from the agency of the person. In understanding that, oral formulaic theory makes a big contribution, but we also need a grasp of the way that the evolution of human cognition has equipped us to create models of the mind out of the more basic ways in which we interact with the natural and social environments.

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