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STRATEGIES OF POWER, TACTICS OF EMANCIPATION. HIDDEN CURRICULUM AND PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS¹

*One sounds the words of the
master and the words of the
student; so who to listen?*

Kiddushin 52

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES. THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS WITH CONDITIONS OF EMANCIPATION

The dichotomy of the official and hidden curriculum seems to duplicate the specific perception of the relationship between theory and practice prevailing in humanities, and thus inherit the troublesome permeation and mutual conditioning of the opposing dimensions observed by researchers. It is difficult to describe the position of subjects

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in the face of such a divided educational reality, i.e. their position in the face of conditions which, on the one hand, should remain inaccessible to the consciousness of actors operating in school in order to have a hidden but effective influence on their behaviour, shape their attitudes, and, on the other hand, constitute a permanent component of the practice of those actors, the practice they co-create and reproduce adapting each time to the requirements of the constantly changing situation. The ambiguity of the impact of the hidden curriculum is that, in order to move smoothly and successfully within their own area, participants in school activities need to have a certain amount of knowledge about which they cannot know. Therefore, it is difficult to decide whether the critical approach demystifying the hidden curriculum includes the conditions created by the institution or the knowledge resources, attitudes and motivations of the participants of the events taking place in it. Critical pedagogy, closer to Marxism-related sociology in this sociology, in its commitment to the interests of diagnosis tends to ontologize the hidden curriculum, placing it on the side of the reality of the institution, rather than trying to answer the question why there is a circulation, shifts and displacements within it and between it and the officially established school practice, or why the diagnosed hidden curriculum remains without any effect on some school education participants. In this tendency to establish the ontology of the hidden curriculum, there would be nothing perverse if it were not for the fact that such a critical approach and deterministic definition of the situation blocks the emancipatory initiative. It assumes that the participants of the school practice are not able to free themselves from the factors implicitly moulding them without changing the external conditions and ontologies of the situation. However, imposing these changes does not lead to the empowerment of the subject, he/she will still remain controlled from the outside. One can only guess that the content of the hidden curriculum will undergo a metamorphosis.

Similarly, the research and analyses of the hidden curriculum presented to the students of the art of education takes the form of parallel official documents, such as general statements or norms which, not realized and disintegrating the established school routine, are derived from and accompany the legally accepted conditions of school practice. The disclosure of these norms in accordance with the intention

of emancipatory pedagogy would motivate to change the practice, its transformation, accepting as the norms new directives determining the conduct, leads again to the routine, habit and creation of the area of what is unaware in action. At the same time, it is assumed that this 'new' hidden agenda will not be disintegrating and motivating to take a critical stance by researchers of the hidden curriculum, but it will be coordinated in a modernist way, eliminating numerous discrepancies with what is intentional and officially allowed to participate in school practice. From the point of view of emancipatory pedagogy, the critical reference to the content of the hidden curriculum and the adoption of new directives of procedure, on the basis of the current state of affairs, cannot provide a credible answer to the question of what side effects the change in practice will entail, dictated by the desire to prevent the effects of the hidden curriculum diagnosed in other conditions. The research interest seems to be critically secured, but is unable to serve as a basis for emancipatory school practice. The new situation requires new research, which for teachers and students may mean a constant regression. The intentions of studying the hidden curriculum do not seem to be so much erroneous as distorting the roles of power, subject and significance of the dynamics of practices taking place in the school space.

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

In October 1912, new residents moved into the unfinished Orphanage House at 92 Krochmalna Street, where Henryk Goldszmit became the director. Within a short period of time, the director, known from numerous publications as Janusz Korczak, instilled a number of innovative solutions in the organization of the House, including the establishment of the Peer Court. The Court applies to everyone, both staff and children. It shall meet once a week and five judges shall be chosen by random drawing for each fifty cases to be tried. Sentences are passed on the basis of the Code, which is regulated by the Judicial Council appointed in a secret ballot. Within six months, Korczak submits himself to the court five times. He writes down as follows:

I assessed the value of the Court and the usefulness of the code during the one-year trial period. The smallest number of cases during a week – fifty; the largest – a hundred and thirty. Twenty five issues of the Court Gazette were published in that year. The first [...] was issued after the first month of the experiment. The ninth issue appeared six months later when the Court was suspended for four weeks. After the intermission, the Judicial Board was set up and Court Gazette No. 19 reported on its activity. It will be best, it seems to me, to tell how things went [...]².

So he does.

ROUTINE, PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND DISCIPLINARY POWER IN THE LIGHT OF THE STRUCTURATION THEORY BY ANTHONY GIDDENS

Emphasizing the role of individual reflection and practical consciousness in the constitution of social actions is an essential feature of the structuration theory developed by Anthony Giddens. It also assumes that most of the social interactions in which we participate in everyday life take the routine character because of our specific need to maintain a sense of ontological security³, stabilisation and synchronisation of identity, actions and situations. Routine characterizes both the subject as social situations in which he or he is involved.

Routine – according to Giddens – is integral both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily

² J. Korczak, “How to Love a Child”, [in:] J. Korczak, *Selected Works*, Warsaw 1967, p. 371–372.

³ A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge 1984, p. 60. “A sense of trust in the continuity of the object-world and in the fabric of social activity [...] depends upon certain specifiable connections between the individual agent and the social contexts through which that agent moves in the course of day-to-day life” (Ibidem). Giddens draws the notion of ontological security from the theory of identity development by Erik H. Erikson (see Ibidem, p. 51–64). To read more on ontological security see also: A. Giddens, “The Self. Ontological Security and Existential Anxiety”, [in:] A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge 1991, p. 35–69.

activities, and to the institutions of society, which are such only through their continued reproduction⁴.

Routine does not lead to the automation of social interactions, and through them social life, reminiscent of the monologues of characters from Eugene Ionesco's works. However,

Routine is founded in tradition, custom or habit, but it is a major error to suppose that these phenomena need no explanation, that they are simply repetitive forms of behaviour carried out 'mindlessly'⁵.

Reconstructing the identity of the subject and social institutions has to cope with the space-time uniformity of daily reality, in which nothing remains inseparable and permanent. According to Giddens, the introduction of such continuity by finding an appropriate time and place for the realization of the remembered patterns of behaviour, cleared of the dense context of past experiences, is an inalienable effort of entities trying to maintain, in spite of numerous obstacles, the relative predictability of the co-created situation. Each reincarnation of behaviour patterns present in the memory, placing them in a new context, requires from the actor a social creative initiative, sensitivity to incompatibilities, as well as a constant responsive observation of the reactions of others to the actions initiated by him/her.

Ordinary day-to-day social life, by contrast – in greater or lesser degree, according to context and the vagaries of individual personality – involves an ontological security founded on an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines and encounters. The routinized character of the paths a long which individuals move in the reversible time of daily life does not just 'happen'. It is 'made to happen' by the modes of reflexive monitoring of action which individuals sustain in circumstances of co-presence⁶.

⁴ A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 60. The main assumptions of the theory of structuration are listed by Giddens in the last chapter of the book *The Constitution of Society*, entitled: "Structuration Theory, Empirical Research and Social Critique" (see *Ibidem*, p. 281–288).

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 86.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 64. I try to approach reflexivity in the categories of translation hermeneu-

Thanks to a skilful adaptation, the subject can feel safe with himself or herself, stimulate self-confidence in others, thus encouraging to adopt an equally open attitude. Cooperation in such conditions can foster coordination and the achievement of mutually non-translatable goals set by the individuals who contribute to the course of the meeting. Maintaining the developed together definition of the situation⁷ of a meeting as a dialogue depends then on the mutual decision. The meeting may any time be cancelled or drastically change its character. Sometimes once and for all.

Giddens does not assume that the conditions of the meeting are transparent to the participants or to third parties or researchers. The participants of the meeting are not united by unanimity of consciousness, in their autonomy the subjects must remain inaccessible to each other, they communicate, but they are separated from each other. Also, the scenery of the meeting is perceived selectively and differently by each of the actors, used and interpreted in varying ways – it should be noted that these acts of perception and reading the details of the scenery are also subject to routine processes. Similarly, despite the fact that the actor monitors the course of the meeting in a reflective way, certain areas of his own participation in it are not directly and discursively

tics proposed by George Steiner and individual power of judgment by Hannah Arendt, see G. Steiner, "Understanding as Translation", [in:] G. Steiner, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford 1992; H. Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy" and "Thinking and Moral Considerations", [in:] H. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. J. Kohn, New York 2003.

- ⁷ "Whenever individuals come together in a specific context they confront [...] the question 'What is going on here?' 'What is going on?' is unlikely to admit of a simple answer because in all social situations there may be many things 'going on' simultaneously. But participants in interaction address this question characteristically on the level of practice, gearing their conduct to that of others. Or, if they pose such a question discursively, it is in relation to one particular aspect of the situation that appears puzzling or disturbing" (A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 87). This term is used by Erving Goffman, on whose concept Giddens bases his structuration theory to a large extent. Goffman observes: "Regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind and of his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to control the conduct of the others, especially their responsive treatment of him. This control is achieved largely by influencing the definition of the situation which the others come to formulate, and he can influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan" (E. Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Edinburgh 1956, p. 2-3; see also: *Ibidem*, p. 1-9).

available to him. Giddens divides the knowledge of a single actor between three instances, the discursive consciousness, the practical consciousness and the unconscious, thus arranging the triad developed by Sigmund Freud for the needs of structuration theory. As he explains,

Practical consciousness involves recall which the agent has access in the *durée* of action without being able to express what he or she thereby 'knows'. The unconscious refers to modes of recall to which the agent does not have direct access because there is a negative 'bar' of some kind inhibiting its unmediated incorporation within the reflexive monitoring of conduct and, more particularly, within discursive consciousness⁸.

The theory of structuration assumes that a significant part of the knowledge, including, among others, patterns of action, being deposited within the bodily space-time continuum of a living organism, is not subject to the full disposition of discursive consciousness. The actor does not need to be able to express this knowledge in order for the interaction to run smoothly, but has to use it properly, so Giddens focuses his attention on the practical consciousness on which the outcome of the meeting depends.

Practical consciousness consists of knowing the rules and the tactics whereby daily social life is constituted and reconstituted across time and space. Social actors can be wrong some of the time about what these rules and tactics might be – in which cases their errors may emerge as 'situational improprieties'. But if there is any continuity to social life at all, most actors must be right most of the time; that is to say, they know what (they are doing, and they successfully communicate their knowledge to others. The knowledge ability incorporated in the practical activities which make up the bulk of daily life is a constitutive feature (together with power) of the social world⁹.

The rule of routine is to place beyond discursive consciousness some factors that can lead to social interaction in everyday life. They are not

⁸ A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 49; see also: M. de Certeau, "The Arts of Theory", [in:] M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1988.

⁹ A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 90.

problematic, but they are revealed to the actors successively during the course of the meeting. The situation is different in the case of violation or destruction of the definition of a situation developed together with others, when “protective measures” cease to inspire trust.

The swamping of habitual modes of activity by anxiety which cannot be adequately contained by the basic security system is specifically a feature of critical situations¹⁰.

Sensing such moments, called by Giddens “critical situations”, is neither completely individual nor extraordinary.

However, forming as they do an intrinsic part of the continuity of social life, even though they are discontinuities for individuals, such situations tend themselves to have a definitely routinized character¹¹.

Deviations from routine or its severance are an important circumstance in defining the situation that triggers a critical procedure. By monitoring the difference with the expected course of routine action, they allow the actors to outline the limitations of the knowledge used so far and to find alternative ways to exceed it. Actors must be more inventive than usual to give their actions, oscillating to regain the sense of ontological security, and at the same time the whole sequence of interactions the desired continuity, but also the margin of freedom turns out to be wider. Like Socrates, the “critical situation”, by challenging routine solutions, undermines the actors’ definition of a situation, forces them to search for a basis for a new definition, and thus to look closer at the determinants of the encounter. This strengthens both the discursive and practical consciousness of the subjects. It is worth noting that the subjective influence on the definition of a situation, which enables actors to learn through practice and reflective monitoring of the conditions and course of interaction, is not only characterised by “critical situations”. These, however, may deepen the

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 50–51.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 61. “By ‘critical situations’ I mean circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines” (Ibidem).

actors' insight into themselves and the complexity of the situation, and reveal its unnoticed threads and nuances.

Interaction loses its critical potential if any side dominates, controlling the definition of the situation and thus limiting the creativity of other actors, which contributes to undermining their sense of ontological security and, in the long run, despite the familiarization of the situation, impoverishing practical and discursive consciousness. In other words, from the point of view of structuration theory, it is not so much a routine that inhibits the potential for learning and change that opens up to actors with the development of interaction, but rather the effective imposition of a pattern that determines each course of interaction by either side.

The study of power – as Giddens emphasizes – cannot be regarded as a second-order consideration in the social sciences. Power cannot be tacked on, as it were, after the more basic concepts of social science have been formulated. There is no more elemental concept than that of power¹².

The approach adopted by Giddens makes it possible to analyze the interactions occurring in schools from the perspective of the coercion measures applied in order to maintain domination and enforce subordination. As he points out,

Disciplinary spacing is part of the architectural character of schools, both in the separation of classrooms and in the regulated spacing of desks that is often found inside them. There is no doubt that spatial divisions of this sort facilitate the routinized specification and allocation of tasks¹³.

Nevertheless it means both discarding the troublesome dualism of the “hidden” and “official” curriculum.

The disciplinary context of the classroom is not just a ‘backdrop’ to what goes on in the school class; it is mobilized within the dialectic of control¹⁴.

¹² Ibidem, p. 283.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 135.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 136. “A school is a ‘container’, generating disciplinary power. The enclosed nature of school life makes possible a strict co-ordination of the serial encounters in

HIDDEN CURRICULUM AS A RESULT OF THE AUTHORITIES' ACTIONS

Routine interests us here through its connection with the hidden curriculum. Structuration theory, which combines perspectives of sociology, psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology, criticism of functionalism and structuralism with existential phenomenology, philosophy of dialogue, of the late Wittgenstein, ethno-methodology, symbolic interactionism, critical theory of the Frankfurt School and poststructuralism of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, seems to promise the integration of critical and emancipatory pedagogy. Assuming that the subject of the practice is contemplative, monitors his actions, and is a social researcher able to redefine social situation on the basis of gained experience, allows us to look at the issues of hidden curriculum not from a normative perspective, but from the perspective of control of social interactions, and with it the dynamics of learning processes. The framework for actions in a situation of control is only exceptionally negotiable. In other words, the subject is forced to reproduce norms that can be formulated discursively or that are appropriate to practical awareness, "official" as well as "confidential", because he or she cannot effectively influence, either spontaneously or in a planned way, the change of the framework of action established from above. It is not at all certain whether the actor identifies with these norms and, if so, whether the internalisation of new norms derived from the criticism of the hidden curriculum and the institutional, external to the subject, transformation of the conditions in which school education takes place, does not continue the fundamental problem of disciplinary authority, transferring subordination, the subject's lack of influence on the conditions of his or her operation and confusion on the newly defined field of interaction. It is not even certain whether the internalized norms of the hidden curriculum related to the school space-time continuum and the discipline adopted in it will be activated by the subject in other learning spaces, for example in the space of learning from everyday life, where such a discipline does not exist¹⁵. Reproduction of the norms

which inmates are involved" (Ibidem, p. 135); see also the whole analysis conducted by Giddens: Ibidem, p. 132-139.

¹⁵ K. Illeris, "Learning Spaces", [in:] K. Illeris, *The Three Dimensions of Learning. Contemporary Learning Theory in the Tension Field Between the Cognitive, the Emotional and*

of hidden curriculum is secondary in relation to the effects of the action of the authority.

Teachers education in the scope of the hidden curriculum, taking the form of reconstruction, recognition of its norms, is in line with the logic of disciplinary authority - it is determined in advance, which is a proper definition of a situation¹⁶, subtly blaming those who are used to subordination for obeying the old law. The teacher does not appear here as a researcher, despite the fact that his or her discursive consciousness is broadened. Subjective participation of students in education is parallel to the problem of subjective participation of teachers. The teacher may not fully perceive the significance of the fact that it occurs from the perspective of students' practical awareness, less often discursive, as a representative of hierarchy, a visible carrier of disciplinary power, where his or her very presence becomes a sign of continuity of power¹⁷, and also that his or her routine stemming from subordination organizes and enforces the routine, at least apparent, on the subordinated subjects. The core of the hidden curriculum is the habit of submission. The question whether the teacher can undermine the status given to him/her as a carrier of institutional power is whether the disciplining authority is really continuous or whether it penetrates the thresholds of the spaces separated in the school without disturbances. Doesn't the area in which the teacher operates guarantee him/her relative autonomy, which he/she could discover, study and use? Do such acts of questioning one's own routine and oneself as a carrier of power not release other subjects involved in the situation from the necessity of submission and do not open up new spaces for them, in which they could influence the definition of the situation, and thus, extending their subjective participation in the action, emancipate themselves through practice?

the Social, Roskilde 2002.

¹⁶ The definition of *hidden curriculum* is derived from the experience of a critic who does not participate in classroom activities in the same way as a teacher or pupils. Taking an "external" perspective, he makes a description of the state of his own discursive consciousness. The value of his reflection is therefore relative.

¹⁷ For example, we might ask if the principle of organising classes works for students invariably after the teacher leaves the classroom, or in what categories should the student's gesture be understood when he or she is telling the teacher that he or she is deviating from the routine?

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

The introduction of the Peer Court redefines the situation in the Orphanage located on Krochmalna Street, exposes the areas and principles of functioning, distribution and role of power that were previously hidden, contrary to educational intentions and inaccessible to its director.

I quickly realized during the first weeks that many petty matters, annoying to the children, creating a disturbance, did not and could not reach the teacher. A teacher who claims that he knows everything that goes on is deliberately lying. I have satisfied myself that the teacher is no expert on problems affecting children. I have satisfied myself that a teacher's power exceeds his competence. There exists an entire hierarchy among the children in which every older one has the right to humiliate, or at least to ignore a child two years younger than he, that willfulness is strictly apportioned according to the age of children. And the guardian of that edifice of lawlessness is the teacher. *Sic volo, sic jubeo*¹⁸.

Astonished, he notices that not only he monitors the situation in a reflexive way:

It is amazing how every problem left unsettled, every carelessly defined order or ban, every oversight, come to the surface and exert retribution in the Court¹⁹.

An organized crisis of routine broadens its practical and then discursive consciousness.

Sometimes a single matter better characterized a child for me than months of familiarity. Occasionally, one particular matter better characterized the social environment than detached observation over a number of months. As the Clerk of the Court I was learning my ABC's, perfecting myself,

¹⁸ J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", op. cit., p. 345.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 348.

finally to become an expert on children's problems. [...] Those petty cases drove me to consider all the complex problems of communal life²⁰.

IN-BETWEEN. DISCONTINUITY OF POWER VERSUS AUTHORITY ACCORDING TO HANNAH ARENDT

Fear of power and loss of control, while at the same time ensuring a sense of ontological security, can effectively block the teachers' self-emancipation initiative. Importantly, this possibility of a teacher losing control of the situation should make us aware of the polarity of two phenomena, i.e. the authority and power, which, according to Hannah Arendt, merge into one in the commonly accepted optics.

Since authority – Hannah Arendt writes – always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical²¹.

The distinction emphasized by Arendt is important for us, because the school space we are talking about in terms of emancipation conditions assumes inequality and functioning of the hierarchy. What is equally important is that Arendt sees a link between the need for authority and the need, as Giddens calls it, to maintain a sense of ontological security, to counteract unpredictability²², which accompanies numerous individuals undertaking activities in the daily reality that is common to them.

According to her, authority in fact inclines people to obedience, but it influences individuals in a different way than power, because it

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 347.

²¹ H. Arendt, "What is Authority?", [in:] H. Arendt, *Between Past and Future. Six Exercises in Political Thought*, New York 1961, p. 92–93.

²² See H. Arendt, "Irreversibility and the Power To Forgive" and "Unpredictability and the Power of Promise", [in:] H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago, London 1998.

is a derivative of the other party's decision, subjective recognition, and not enforced subordination that breaks all resistance. Perhaps having this in mind, Arendt writes as follows "Authority implies an obedience in which men retain their freedom [...]"²³. It is the element of coercion that, as she analyses the issue, collides with authority. It might seem that where there is coercion, authority is no longer necessary, but in a classroom situation, when the source of disciplinary power is outside the classroom, it is the teacher who, with his/her ingenuity, maintains the effectiveness of its influence, using the authority vested in him, maintains the continuity of power²⁴, becoming at the same time its holder.

Although power and authority are in a direct relationship, their relationship can take on different forms. The discursive overlapping of these two phenomena seems to hide the space of the teacher's relative autonomy, the space in which he/she makes arbitrary decisions in practice. On the school grounds, the distribution of power and authority cannot completely overlap, and the statement "It's not up to me" awkwardly tries to hide only this fact. Students are not directly subordinate to external authority, but to its adaptation as proposed by the teacher. The difference of opinion between the successive levels of the school hierarchy and the points of its horizontal structure may give rise to a well-founded fear in students that direct reference to a higher, and therefore institutionally more important, order will undermine the authority of the teacher concerned, and their success depends on his or her definition of the classroom situation. This discrepancy can of course be settled for the benefit of the students. But what is important for us is that the teacher becomes the guardian of law in the absence of his/her superiors or impartial representatives in

²³ H. Arendt, "What is Authority?", op. cit., p. 106. "Discipline through surveillance is a potent medium of generating power, but it none the less depends upon the more or less continuous compliance of those who are its, subjects" (A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 180). See also the article by Bogdan Szlachta who distinguishes the changes going in the history of European culture as regards the approach to authority: B. Szlachta, "Autorytet", [in:] *Słownik społeczny*, ed. B. Szlachta, Kraków 2004, p. 27-33. This condensed review reveals that cultural patterns have a major impact on what can and does be considered an authority and how it is practiced to subordinate its power.

²⁴ Its continuity in its own right is impossible, see A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 138-139.

the classroom. He or she enforces the regulations there and, in order to be effective, must have a certain surplus of powers to adapt the numerous, often mutually exclusive, requirements, rules and regulations to the situations generated by the students or the situations created by them to the rules and regulations. As Martin Buber observes, when considering the question of the nature of authority,

All forms of government have this in common: each possesses more power than is required by the given conditions; in fact, this excess in the capacity for making dispositions is actually what we understand by political power. The measure of this excess, which cannot of course be computed precisely, represents the exact difference between Administration and Government. I call it the 'political surplus'. [...] The political principle is always stronger in relation to the social principle than the given conditions require. The result is a continuous diminution in social spontaneity²⁵.

As in any more or less hierarchical institution, a teacher at school, while having a modest political power at his or her disposal, may prudently limit the strength of its "external" pressure, thus expanding the space for spontaneous student activity, subjective participation in defining social situations, reversing the tendency defined by the dialogue specialist. He or she may do it but does not have to.

The demarcation would naturally have to be revised and improved continually to conform to the changing conditions. [...] Let us put it in this way: Efforts must be renewed again and again to determine in what spheres it is possible to alter the ratio between governmental and administrative control in favour of the latter²⁶.

DIVISION OF POWER, AUTHORITY AND EMANCIPATION

The teacher supports the power with his or her authority, prolonging its continuity. Power as compulsion limits authority, but does not

²⁵ M. Buber, "Society and the State", [in:] M. Buber, *Pointing the Way. Collected Essays*, New York 1957, p. 174-175.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 175.

eliminate it. This gap accessible to practical consciousness is the beginning of emancipation, emancipation, which does not lead to the abolition of power, but to its just division. Power-sharing is a way of dealing with the risks of violence and coercion, but it should be noted that the legitimate disciplinary power of institutions is not their sole source. All too often, the weakness of an institution is exploited by its petitioners; individually and in groups, teachers, pupils and administrative staff bully, humiliate and exploit weaker individuals who have no support. Teachers who refuse to exercise their power cannot relinquish authority and responsibility for the consequences of allowing unfair practices that undermine the ontological security of the humiliated²⁷. Accepting the administrator's position will not confuse the fluctuations-sensitive involuntary participants of adverse events. However, this is one of the measures commonly used to disguise the habit of subjugation. No wonder, then, that in situations perceived as a threat from the authorities, students resort to tested patterns, use the tactics available to them, devote more energy to restoring their sense of ontological security, exemplary fulfilment of external claims and examining the areas of predictability of teachers and institutions rather than to trusting learning practices that make knowledge available²⁸. The greater the sense of ontological security, the greater the margin of tolerance for what is possible according to learning subjects to change within a routine, but which does not directly lead to an increase in activity or commitment.

The existence of a modern school, a herald of independence and autonomy, a vestibule of involvement in civil society, entails a systematic setting of requirements and hence the presence of both power and authority. Disciplinary authority, while leaving room for the teacher's authority, leaves the tools at his/her disposal to enable him/

²⁷ Hannah Arendt raises the question of personal responsibility for refusing to use individual power of judgment in radically oppressive conditions, but the moral issues raised in the context of politics – responsibility, freedom and justice – are analogous to the subject of this work, see H. Arendt, "Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship", [in:] H. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, op. cit., p. 51-79.

²⁸ In this way, a sphere is created which the researchers of the hidden curriculum, together with its elements, may consider autonomous and relatively constant. It should also be noted that research into the hidden curriculum does not have to be used for emancipation; its results may well be used to tighten control.

her, within the limits of the surplus available, to share power and re-define the situation of classroom meetings²⁹. Regardless of who initiates the change of practice, new areas of knowledge, which could not be fully disclosed to any of the parties due to the established standard practice, are made available to the parties as reflexive monitors. Importantly, the teacher acts as an independent researcher of the hidden curriculum.

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

The Director of the Orphanage House continues his studies. He writes down as follows:

Barbarian customs in a respectable institution in the capital city of a civilized country. But until recently, not only would I have acquiesced in such a state of affairs but would even have found some enchanting aspects to it. I tended to take a light-hearted view of it since a gay little urchin appealed to me more than the somewhat awkward hussy. The fact that this disarming little rascal tyrannized a group of children, while at the same time making ,up to me, that a little pilferer was being reared in the spirit of the right to be lawless – those aspects escaped my attention, were below the threshold of my teacher’s consciousness³⁰.

KorczaK’s studies lead him to reveal the relationship between morality and politics.

the Court must defend the timid that they may not be bothered by the strong. The Court must defend the conscientious and hard working that they should not be annoyed by the careless and idle. The Court must see

²⁹ Let’s assume such a situation, a group of pupils takes the initiative to change the arrangement of the benches so that the pupils sit face to face with each other, the teacher agrees and discusses the issue with the class. It turns out, however, that the benches are attached to the floor. There was no change, but it cannot be said that the actors did not put themselves and the class conditions in a new light. Does the teacher know what they have learned?

³⁰ J. Korczak, “How to Love a Child”, op. cit., p. 347.

that there is order because disorder does the most harm to the good, the quiet and the conscientious. The Court is not justice but it should try for justice. The Court is not the truth but it wants the truth³¹.

The division of power reveals the fundamental importance of establishing the authority so that an individual power unit can be constituted to judge alumni, develop their independence and autonomy.

It is true, the Court is not a pleasant place. But it was not set up for fun. Its business is to watch over law and order. The Court's purpose is to prevent the teacher's having to enforce obedience brutally with a cane, shouting like a rude cowhand or farm laborer. Instead, the teacher can calmly and reasonably consider, advise, assess the situation together with the children who frequently know better who is right or the extent to which one of their members is at fault. The Court's business is to replace arguments with thinking, violent outbursts with educational activity³².

Limiting disciplinary power in favour of authority heralds the establishment of an area in which alumni can act responsibly, build new relationships, experiment with routine, and at the same time feel safe.

I declare that these few cases have been the nub of my training as a new "constitutional" teacher who avoids maltreatment of children not because he likes or loves them, but because there is a certain institution which protects them against the teacher's law-lessness, willfulness and despotism³³.

ON THE OTHER HAND. TACTICS AND INTERCEPTION OF A PLACE ACCORDING TO MICHEL DE CERTEAU

The relative autonomy of the teacher in the classroom is a result of the hierarchy of power in the institution. He can treat the classroom area as 'his/her own' because of his/her powers to manage it and, as Giddens noted, the way in which the space is planned is conducive to the routine

³¹ Ibidem, p. 313.

³² Ibidem, p. 341.

³³ Ibidem, p. 351.

definition and assignment of tasks. In this sense, the classroom area is not an ally of the autonomy of students and one should ask whether they have, apart from the possibility of reflection, an inner distance to the situation, a form of resistance practice independent of the authorities, with an emancipatory potential. The lack of such a potential in the practical awareness of the students would mean that emancipation would have to start for them *ex nihilo* or be enforced.

Michel de Certeau, a researcher of consumer practices in the world of everyday life, distinguishes two types of sets of practices, strategies and tactics that can be successfully combined with two types of roles in the classroom i.e. a teacher and a student. According to him, it is the strategies that “conceal beneath objective calculations their connection with the power that sustains them from within the stronghold of its own »proper« place or institution”³⁴. Consumers whose practices are observed by de Certeau, who do not have the appropriate power and background, and who cannot directly oppose the strategies of power, use numerous, difficult to detect, more reminiscent of wandering rather than deliberate attempts, tactics to thwart and intercept the dominant forces.

[...] because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time - it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized “on the wing”. Whatever it wins, it does not keep. It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into “opportunities”. The weak must continually turn to their own ends forces alien to them³⁵.

In this secretive way, in conditions of complex loyalty, actors mark their minimum personal share of the situations defined by the authorities, allowing them to maintain an erroneous perception of their own continuity.

The child still scrawls and daubs on his schoolbooks; even if he is punished for this crime, he has made a space for himself and signs his existence as an author on it³⁶.

³⁴ M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, op. cit., p. xx.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. xix. “The art of »pulling tricks« involves a sense of the opportunities afforded by a particular occasion” (Ibidem, p. 37).

³⁶ Ibidem, p. 31.

Slightly beyond the control of authority, practicing on the margins of disciplinary space, students construct their own limited definition of the situation, taking advantage of every opportunity to realize the need for agency, subjective participation in education and regaining knowledge about what is currently happening with them.

In numerable ways of playing and foiling the other's game (*jouer / déjouer le jeu de l'autre*), that is, the space instituted by others, characterize the subtle, stubborn, resistant activity of groups which, since they lack their own space, have to get along in a network of already established forces and representations³⁷.

This creative do-it-yourself activity of students is also an area of practice in which the teacher has no insight when implementing strategies. Similarly, from the point of view of "politics of the voice", practical awareness of tactics does not necessarily translate into discursive consciousness of the students, but if the resources available to the teacher were to make the classroom space hospitable to the students, it would establish a substitute for asylum, allowing for a dialogue that is conducive to learning, examination of the hidden curriculum and emancipatory changes, rather than a clash between strategy and tactics, political principle and social principle. The school classroom, thanks to its separation from other spaces, its distinction from them, a permanent, a well-known companionship that can give a sense of ontological security, is a good place to experiment with routine. Only a hospitable land as if it were 'no man's land' can become the promised land, as long as there is a struggle for territory, this kingdom remains out of this world.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 18. "Dwelling, moving about, speaking, reading, shopping, and cooking are activities that seem to correspond to the characteristics of tactical ruses and surprises: clever tricks of the »weak« within the order established by the »strong«, an art of putting one over on the adversary on his own turf, hunter's tricks, maneuverable, polymorph mobilities, jubilant, poetic, and warlike discoveries" (Ibidem, p. 40). Also Giorgio Agamben writes about emancipation practices similar to the tactics proposed by de Certeau, see G. Agamben, "In Praise of Profanation", [in:] G. Agamben, *Profanations*, New York 2007.

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST – ANNEX

The situation in the Orphanage on Krochmalna Street is constantly changing as a result of the released emancipatory potential of the pupils. Korczak writes down:

It would seem that the Court could have given the adults some respect for the children. But on the contrary, even those who formerly had some respect began to lose it. Still worse. The judges conspired either to acquit or to judge leniently. That was the line of least resistance. Finally, things reached the point where a judge hit another who wanted to conduct the trial according to his conscience. It is hardly possible to delay. The Court serves no useful purpose but is harmful. The Court does not introduce order but disorder. The Court does not improve anyone but, on the contrary, spoils the better ones. Such a Court cannot possibly be allowed to exist for even a day longer. Six months of hard work wasted. Whoever takes his job seriously will understand how much it hurts and saddens us³⁸.

The dynamics of changes teaches, but also undermines the sense of ontological security. The development of events and their investigations, which do not bring universal knowledge, lead the director to a conclusion that it is necessary to make necessary corrections in the way the court operates.

I hate the Court; I would rather have hands and head smacked, anything rather than the Court. I can't stand the Court, hate it. I don't want to charge anyone, or anyone to charge me". There were several of them. The Court caught them unawares – an unforeseen and most dangerous enemy-recorder, enemy-propagandist, enemy-telescope. [...] Significantly enough, that handful overthrew the Court. When I decided to suspend the Court I had no doubt that there would be no more than a brief recess for a couple of weeks or so for the purpose of introducing certain modifications and additions. Even so, it was a grave setback to me. For I realized

³⁸ J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", op. cit., p. 334-335.

then how hard it would be for Courts to prove themselves in educational establishments conducted by others³⁹.

The activity of the Colleague Court in the Orphanage House at 92 Krochmalna Street was suspended for four weeks.

Some children sighed with relief, they were rid of a vigilant watchdog. Others, anxious to prove that the Court was unnecessary, behaved better than before. There was a group which kept asking when the Court would be resumed. Moreover, a sizeable group displayed little interest in the Court, as is generally true in all human relations⁴⁰.

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³⁹ Ibidem, p. 347-348.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 350.

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Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to present the questions associated with hidden curriculum in the perspective of cultural and political anthropology. Focusing on division and distribution of disciplinary power and authority in the space of school, it explores the role of a teacher in the process of empowerment of pupils and regaining by them the subject position. The article develops studies undertaken in the book *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu (Lévinas. Toward the Pedagogy of Asylum)*.

Keywords:

authority, critical pedagogy, definition of the situation, discursive consciousness, division and distribution of disciplinary power, education of teacher, emancipation, empowerment, hidden curriculum, ontological security, practical consciousness, reflexivity, routine