@misc{Wilk_Aleksandra_Patrycja_Commentary_2018,
 author={Wilk, Aleksandra Patrycja},
 copyright={Copyright by Aleksandra Patrycja Wilk},
 address={Wrocław},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2018},
 publisher={E-Wydawnictwo. Prawnicza i Ekonomiczna Biblioteka Cyfrowa. Wydział Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego},
 language={pol},
 language={eng},
 abstract={The subject of this gloss to the judgment of the Supreme Court is wrong, according to the author, i.e. the stance of the Supreme Court that a final conviction for a common offense, i.e. article 278 § 2 k.k. (criminal code) is an obstacle to the application of an institution of conditional fiscal penal redemption in relation to the perpetrator of a fiscal offense if he or her failed to fulfil the premise of not having previous criminal record, resulting from the provisions of article 41 § 1 k.k.s. (fiscal criminal code) in connection with article 66 § 1 k.k. when applying article 20 § 2 k.k.s. The gloss contains an analysis of the doctrinal view and case-law on the subject of conditional discontinuance of fiscal penal proceedings resulting from the above-mentioned provisions. The author draws attention to the separate nature of common and tax crimes, the manner of proper application of the content of the legal norm of article 66 § 1 k.k. (criminal code) in penal fiscal proceedings, and also indicates arguments justifying the disapproval indicated in the gloss for the stance adopted in the Supreme Court judgment regarding the premise of the criminal's previous unpunishability.},
 title={Commentary to the Supreme Court’s judgement of 18 October 2016, II KK 205/16},
 keywords={probation measures, prior criminal record of the perpetrator, unpunished person, fiscal penal law, intentional crime, conditional redemption of proceedings, fiscal penal measures},
}